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Abstract
Divestment of Strategic Resources in a Hypercompetitive,
Capital Intensive, Knowledge Based Industry
Steven Robert Rivet

Dr. Enrique Perez, DBA Committee Chair

This dissertation creates a model explaining the factors that drive the
decision by a semiconductor firm to divest a specific strategic resource. The
dissertation is based on a case study of a medium size semiconductor firm that
divested a competitively performing manufacturing facility in a low labor cost
Asian country, and replaced the services it performed with contracted services. The
study draws on competitive advantage, resource based view, transaction cost,
divestment, international business, and asset-light model literature. The existing
literature either fails to explain (or to explain completely) the reasons driving these
type of divestiture decisions (resource based view, transaction cost economics,
international business theory), or explains them only at a firm level (divestment and
asset light theory). The contribution that this dissertation creates is a model that
explains the decision at the specific strategic resource level, i.e. a theory of why
one particular strategic resource would be divested by a firm, but not another.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Overview

Firms seek competitive advantage by creating or obtaining strategic
resources, i.e. resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and organizationally
exploitable (Barney, 2002a; Knott, 2015). In recent decades, in the quest for
competitive advantage, many firms have been pursuing an asset light strategy
(Page, 2007; Liou, Tang, & Huang, 2008; Liou, 2011; Surdu, 2011; Sohn, 2013),
attempting to apply limited financial resources into their most productive possible
use (Maly & Palter, 2002), and eliminating those that are not creating competitive
advantage. US semiconductor firms have been divesting some corporate owned
production facilities in low labor cost countries (Muth, 2016) while retaining
ownership of other production facilities and captive design groups, most of which
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are located in the US or other developed, high labor cost countries. These facilities
and design groups are all strategic resources; they are required in order to perform
the semiconductor design and manufacturing process and can, at least in some
firms, provide cost or differentiation advantages over competing firms (Barney,
1991; D’Aveni, 1994). If one or more of these resources are divested, the firm
must subcontract or make other replacement arrangements with other firms to
perform the services provided by the divested resource.
This trend to divest foreign production facilities is the opposite of what
would be predicted by classical theory of internationalization; the theoretical
progression of international operations (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009; Caves,
1982; Porter, 1990) predicts a domestic firm will progress from exporting to
subcontracting to international joint ventures to foreign direct investment.
International business theory suggests that firms will act to internalize market
transactions that are generating profits for external companies, and capturing that
profit for themselves, but semiconductor firms are doing just the opposite,
sometimes increasing the cost of manufacturing in the process (Muth, 2016).
Internationalization theory (Dunning, 1988) would also suggest high cost domestic
design resources would be replaced with lower cost foreign resources either as
subcontracted services or wholly owned design centers, but there is no obvious
evidence of that trend occurring.
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Divestiture theory offers several possible explanations, at the firm level, for
divestment of foreign resources including economic or political distress, problems
associated with the management of a facility in foreign cultures, and lack of
strategic fit (Benito, 1997). This study will attempt to determine whether those
firm level factors apply to the chosen case, to identify other factors not addressed
by previous research driving those decisions, and to determine which factors drive
decisions to divest specific strategic resources, and not others, in a semiconductor
firm.

Background and Rationale of the Study

In an increasingly knowledge driven economy, technological innovations
drive product value and demand, which drive economic activity. Many of the firms
driving technological innovations operate in industries that can be described as
hypercompetitive, capital intensive, and knowledge based. Semiconductor
manufacturing is an example of such an industry, and the firm studied is a medium
size semiconductor manufacturing firm. Semiconductor firms cannot perform their
operations, the design and manufacture of their products, without access to design
and production resources. Semiconductor firms must own these resources or have
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contractual agreements with other firms to provide the services supplied by those
resources.
Each of the three parts of the description of hypercompetitive, capital
intensive, knowledge based industries is a unique characteristic of the
semiconductor industry, although each part can also be used singly or in
combination to describe other industries. By identifying descriptors of the value
and cost of resources that directly address each of these three characteristics, it may
be possible to predict the probability (of interest to academics) or the advisability
(of interest to practitioners) of divestment of a strategic resource based on the value
or state of the descriptor. This study assumes that a service that the resource that
may be divested provides can be purchased from other suppliers of that service on
the open market through subcontracting arrangements.
It can be convincingly argued that complex resources such as design groups
or production facilities are in fact bundles of simpler resources that represent a
strategic capability (Vahlne & Johanson, 2017; Winter, 1987). However, due to the
symbiotic relationship of these simpler resources to form the whole greater than the
sum of the parts (Levitt & March, 1988; Tsoukas, 2003; Johanson & Vahlne,
2009), divesting or retaining the individual component resources would not extract
the maximum value from those resources. The complex capability’s value is
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maximized if it is retained or divested in whole. For the purpose of this study, the
complex capability will be considered a single resource.
The value of a strategic resource in a hypercompetitive industry is driven by
the ability of that resource to enable the generation of serial competitive advantages
(D’Aveni, 1994), and that ability is proposed as one possible driver of this type of
divestment decision. The cost of maintaining a competitively viable and
sustainable strategic resource in a capital intensive industry may exceed the
capability of small and medium enterprises to bear those costs; the cost of
maintaining the resource is proposed as another potential driver of the divestment
of strategic resource decision. In knowledge based industries, the ability to contain
intellectual property within a strategic resource, to prevent its leakage to
competitors is proposed as another potential driver of the strategic resource
divestment decision. The control advantages associated with ownership of a
resource is another proposed driver.
Contribution to sustained competitive advantage, capital requirements,
ability to contain IP, and ownership and control advantages are therefore obvious
candidates for the drivers of strategic resource divestment decisions but they are by
no means the only ones that will be considered. These proposed drivers are
therefore not intended to be an exhaustive list, but were a starting point for the
search for an explanation of specific resource divestment decisions; others were
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identified, and it is possible that the proposed drivers are not important. The case
study approach has attempted to identify the drivers thought by the divestment
decision participants to be important.
Early in the first decade of the 21st century, a medium size semiconductor
firm decided to divest its wholly owned assembly and test manufac turing facility in
a low labor cost Asian country The firm had been a subsidiary of a large electronics
systems firm and had been spun off as a separate, independant entity a short time
before the sale of the assembly and test facility. As an independent firm, and in
preparation for its initial public offering, senior management, in consultation with
the investment bankers that would execute the IPO, took the opportunity to review
the firm’s asset structure strategy (Muth, 2016). The company decided to divest the
assembly and test production facility in Asia, and to subcontract with merchant
suppliers of semiconductor assembly and test services for its manufacturing needs.
The purchaser of the facility, a large merchant assembly and test firm, signed multiyear agreements to provide those services, continuing the majority of the assembly
and test manufacturing operations in the same facilities that had been used before
the divestiture (Muth, 2016). The semiconductor firm had used assembly and test
subcontractors before the sale, and with the execution of the sales, the purchaser of
the Asian assembly and test facility became the semiconductor firm’s largest
subcontractor (Muth, 2016).
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The divestment of this strategically important production resource is not
explained by the existing international business or divestment strategy literature.
The divested facility had been operating at competitive parity, with quality,
capability, and cost performance similar to the assembly and test manufacturing
operations of other medium sized semiconductor firms (Muth, 2016); clearly
something other than performance or strategic fit drove the divestment decision.
The divestiture by semiconductor firms of specific strategic resources that
are critical to the firms’ mission to design and manufacture integrated circuits, and
not other strategic resources, is not adequately explained by existing business
strategy theories. This study has identified the factors driving these divestment
decisions, as well as other decisions not to divest other strategic resources. Asset
light strategy does detail several firm level motivations for divestment of strategic
resources, but does not address the specific decisions as to why some resources are
divested, while others are not.

Statement of the Problem

The factors driving specific details of the implementation of the asset-light
model and strategic resource divestment are not well explored in the literature;
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there are no models that predict the probability and evaluate the desirability and
wisdom of divestiture of a particular strategic resource. The decisions by
semiconductor firms to divest foreign production facilities is the opposite of what
would be predicted by classical theory of internationalization; the theoretical
progression of international operations (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009; Caves,
1982; Porter, 1990) predicts a domestic firm will progress from exporting to
subcontracting to international joint ventures to foreign direct investment.
International business theory (Williamson, 1979; Dunning & Rugman, 1985;
Buckley & Casson, 1998; Buckley, 2002) suggests that firms will act to internalize
market transactions that are generating profits for external companies, and
capturing that profit for themselves. Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory also
suggests that firms will, especially when transaction costs are significant, vertically
integrate to eliminate those costs (Williamson, 1971, 1979, 2003, 2008); however,
many semiconductor firms are doing just the opposite, sometimes increasing the
cost of manufacturing in the process.
Divestiture theory (Boddewyn, 1979) noted several drivers for divestiture of
resources including lack of strategic fit, lack of cultural fit, and financial distress.
Semiconductor firms have been divesting production resources that are necessary
to perform their mission of semiconductor manufacturing; the services provided by
those resources are strategically indispensable. When the resource is divested, the
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firms have to replace the function provided by the resource with contracted
services. In the case studied, it was necessary to determine whether the divested
foreign facility had been performing well (whether cultural fit was a problem
impacting the ability of the resource to fulfill its task, whether the resource was
providing competitive parity with similar facilities at other semiconductor firms),
and whether the firm was in financial distress that would force it to liquidate
important resources to ensure survival, or not. If the case study had indicated
performance or financial problems, divestiture theory would explain the decisions,
but since there were no performance or financial problems, neither IB nor
divestiture theory explains why these resources would be divested. Asset light
theory does, at the firm level, offer an explanation and justification for resource
divestiture when performance or financial problems are absent. The literature on
the asset light model addresses the reasoning behind these divestment decisions as
a reallocation of corporate financial resources to their most productive use (Maly &
Palter, 2002), but does not address industry specific or non-financial drivers of
those decisions. This study has attempted to fill that gap.
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Purpose of the Study

This dissertation attempts to explain the apparent contradiction between
transaction cost, international business, and divestiture theories and observed
divestiture activity of assembly and test facilities by a semiconductor firm that
implemented an asset light strategy, as well as the lack of significant divestment or
transfer of design groups to lower cost locations and a mixed record of divesting
wafer fab facilities. The study attempts to explain the drivers of divestment
decisions for these resources at the level of the individual resource, i.e., why are
some strategic assets divested, but others are not? Are semiconductor firms
implementing an asset light strategy? The study has created a model of the drivers
of divestment decisions that may both explain divestment decisions that have been
made, as well as provide a decision making framework to guide practitioners
considering strategic resource divestment.

Nature of the Study
This study has built a model to explain the decisions to divest (or not)
semiconductor firms’ strategic resources. The study employs a case study
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approach based on the findings from a case of a medium size semiconductor firm’s
divestiture of strategically critical assembly and test manufacturing operation
resource.
The data has been gathered through a series of interviews of persons with
direct knowledge of the reasoning behind, and the effects of, the divestment
decision. The interviewees include executives who made the decision to divest the
resource, executives responsible for executing the divestment, and high level
managers directly affected by the divestment. The people that drove the decision to
divest have the greatest insight into the reasoning behind the decision, while those
executing the divestment and those directly affected have the greatest insight into
the wisdom and success of the divestment. Other interviews with current and
former executives addressed the decisions not to divest wafer fab and design group
resources. This triangulation, or multiple angle view of the various divestment
decision making processes, as well as divestment impact will enrich the
understanding of the factors driving the divestment decision, and the success of the
chosen action.
The author has a network of connections within the semiconductor industry,
and has utilized those connections to gain access to the executives and managers
involved in the decision to divest, and with those affected by the divestment. The
researcher took great effort to build a level of trust with those executives and
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managers, and enabled access resulting in candid conversations regarding the
reasoning behind the actions and the reality of the impacts. This access, and the
need to dig deeply into a specific divestment decision, is the reasoning behind the
decision to utilize the case study approach (Creswell, 2013). The model generated
may be able to be generalized to the semiconductor, and other hypercompetitive,
capital intensive, and/or knowledge based industries.

Research Questions

This study aims to identify the factors driving the decision to divest
strategic resources in the hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based
semiconductor industry. Specifically:

1) What are the drivers of specific strategic resource divestment decisions in
the semiconductor industry?
2) Can the state of the drivers be used to predict the probability or advisability
of strategic resource divestiture in the semiconductor industry?
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These relationships have been addressed through the case study; the
decision to divest an assembly and test facility in a low labor cost Asian country as
well as decisions not to divest other strategic resources were probed. A model with
inputs consisting of the drivers identified and their ability to predict and/or advise
the divestment has been generated with the general form detailed in Figure 1.
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Driver 1

Driver 2

…….

Divestiture
Decision

…
Driver
…n
.
.
Figure 1. Strategic resource divestiture decision model structure

Significance of the Study

A model of semiconductor strategic resource divestment decisions that
identifies the drivers of those decisions may contribute to the theoretical
understanding of the asset light manufacturing model in the global semiconductor
industry, and is therefore of interest to strategy and international business
academics. That same model may also be used to provide guidance to
semiconductor industry practitioners looking for a subjective evaluation technique
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to evaluate the wisdom of specific semiconductor strategic resource divestment
decisions.
While the context of this study is the semiconductor industry, the results
may be generalizable to strategic resources of any hypercompetitive, capital
intensive, knowledge based industries. “The problem of hypercompetitive markets
has spread to the airline, pharmaceutical, financial services, health care, consumer
electronics, telecommunications, broadcasting, auditing, automotive, and computer
industries, among many others.” (D’Aveni, 1998, p. 183). Each of these
hypercompetitive industries can also be described as knowledge based, and most
are also capital intensive. As technology progresses, more industries will fit in the
category of knowledge based, and these industries will move toward
hypercompetition (D’Aveni, 1994). These industries are the drivers of modern
economies, representing an increasing share of the total world economy, suggesting
the results of this study may be widely generalizable.
The study has built a model of the decision making process for divestment
of strategic resources in the semiconductor industry. The model, if verified in that
industry, and found to be generalizable to other hypercompetitive, capital intensive,
and/or knowledge based industries by further empirical research, may contribute
not only to the academic understanding of the divestment decision making process,
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but also provide a useful tool to practitioners engaged in real world decision
making in a large variety of industries other than semiconductor manufacturing.

Assumptions and Limitations

This dissertation is phenomenological study, and takes a case study
approach and will employ the techniques utilized in approach; as such, it is subject
to the typical limitations of those methods. The case chosen, a medium sized
semiconductor firm, is intended to be an instrumental case (Cresswell, 2013; Stake,
1995). The chosen firm is assumed to be representative of the semiconductor
industry, and that industry may be representative of other hypercompetitive, capital
intensive, knowledge based industries; those assumptions that the specific firm
studied is a representative case is important. The phenomenological and case study
techniques applied here are qualitative, and do not include empirical analysis of
statistically large data sets, but will attempt to create a model that can be
empirically tested in future study.
Another key assumption is that the function of strategic resources divested
can be replaced by subcontracting arrangements. This is the case in the
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semiconductor industry, but an absence of this ability in other industries may limit
the generalizability of the findings.
The researcher is a former employee of the firm studied, was aware of the
divestment when it happened, has personal relationships with many of the
interviewees, and may have preconceived notions or biases about the relevant
drivers of the divestment decision. The researcher is aware of the possibility of this
bias leaking into the interviews and data analysis; every attempt has been made to
let the interviewees express unprompted opinions with very open ended questions
comprising the first part of the interview protocol.

Organization of the Remainder of the Study

Chapter 2 is the literature review. This review describes the relevant
literature providing a theoretical framework for the study in the areas of
competitive advantage and the resource based view, with emphasis on the
foundational works and their applicability to the strategic resource divestment
problem. The literature for asset-light strategy will be reviewed, with emphasis on
the reasoning behind the strategy and the gaps in explaining specific strategic
resource divestment decisions. The internationalization and divestment literature
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will be discussed, with emphasis on the lack of explanatory power for the adoption
of the asset-light model.
Chapter 3, Methodology, addresses the choice of a phenomenological
approach with the use of case study techniques. The reasons behind the choice of
the particular case are discussed, as well as the generalizability of the specific case
to the semiconductor industry as a whole, and the generalizability of the
semiconductor industry to other hypercompetitive, capital intensive, and/or
knowledge based industries. The interview technique is justified, and the format of
the interviews (a mix of open ended “why?” questions, and inquiry into the
importance of several possible explanatory factors that emerged from the pilot
study) is discussed.
Chapter 4 presents the study’s findings; details of relevant drivers and states
of those drivers for each of the strategic resources identified are presented. Chapter
5 consists of discussion, conclusions, implications for practice, and suggestions for
future research.

Chapter 2
Literature Review
Overview and Theoretical Framework – Relevant
Models and Theories
The decision to divest (or not) strategic resources inherent in the
implementation of the asset light strategy is an attempt by a firm to improve its
competitive position. The study of the drivers of these decisions must build off of
the literature in the area of competitive advantage, specifically the resource based
view of competitive advantage. The works of Penrose (1959), Barney (1986, 1991,
2001, 2002a, 2002b), and Wernerfelt (1984) provide a solid competitive advantage
and RBV foundation upon which to address the research questions in the particular
case of the semiconductor industry.
In the semiconductor industry, the defining characteristics of the business
are driven by the industry’s hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based
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nature. D’Aveni (1994), D’Aveni, Dagnino and Smith (2010) address the
hypercompetitive aspect of the industry: the fleeting nature of competitive
advantage and the requirement that successful firms continuously create new, short
lived CA, in an emergent, dynamic manner (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) in the face
of fierce and dynamic competition. Grant (1996) introduced the knowledge based
view, which informs the discussion of competitive advantage in a knowledge based
industry and illustrates the importance of intellectual property generation and
protection.
Transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1971, 1979, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2009,
2010) addresses the make or buy decision; Williamson discusses the reasoning and
tradeoffs behind vertical integration decisions. The logic developed by Williamson
can also be applied to divestment or vertical disintegration. Divestment theory
(Boddewyn, 1979; Benito, 1997, 2005; McDermott, 2010) addresses the sell off of
assets due to strategic fit or operational problems, but does not addresses selling
assets that are performing well. The international business literature (Johanson
&Vahlne, 1977, 2009; Dunning, 1988; Buckley & Casson, 1998: Agarwal &
Ramaswani, 1992) provides insight into the building and acquisition of foreign
resources such as the assembly and test facility referenced in the case studied, but
do not provide much insight into the divestment process or the drivers behind
divestment decisions. The asset light literature (Liu, Tang, & Huang, 2008; Surdu,
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2011) specifically addresses the problem of how to most efficiently allocate limited
financial capital resources to achieve the best returns by leveraging, rather than
owning, some strategic resources, especially those with significant capital
investment requirements.
A review of the areas of literature noted is needed to frame the research
questions and provide a starting point for this study. The implementation of the
asset light model is the strategy being studied; however, the drivers of the specific
divestment decisions, why one strategic resource is divested, while other are not, is
not addressed by the present literature. By recognizing the strong theoretical
foundation represented by the literature in competitive advantage, the resource
based view, divestment theory, international business theory, and asset light theory,
we can begin to build a theory for the individual divestment decisions.

Hierarchy of Theories Addressed

Figure 2 illustrates the academic theories that are relevant to this
dissertation, and the hierarchical relationship of those theories amongst themselves
and to the central research questions.
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Figure 2. Theoretical Framework

The research questions seek to extend the understanding of the particulars
of the implementation of asset light theory, which is an extension of the resource
based view (RBV) and divestment theory. RBV, divestment, and asset light are all
contained within the larger umbrella of the subject of competitive advantage. In a
hypercompetitive industry, the ability to create multiple temporary advantages is a
critical component of competitive advantage. Asset light theory also draws upon
the study of dynamic capability and emergent strategy (fewer fixed assets enable
more nimble strategic maneuvering as chaotic environments evolve or change
abruptly), and of return on capital (ROC). ROC, the measure of the efficiency of
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the firm’s capital resource allocation, can be improved by increasing profitability,
the numerator of the ROC equation, or by reducing capital assets, the denominator.
In a knowledge based industry, the knowledge based view (KBV) is an
important component of the RBV, and must be addressed to adequately understand
the RBV framework of analysis. Absorptive capacity, the ability to acquire and
apply knowledge gained from outside the firm is an important component of the
KBV. In a capital intensive industry, divestment theory yields important guidance
on the firm’s capital structure, and that theory is informed by the study of
international/foreign optimum entry modes and by transaction cost theory.

Questions Guiding the Research

The study explores several questions, most importantly, why do firms in
hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based industries choose to divest
specific strategic resources, and not others? What are the factors that drive the
divest or retain decision? Can an understanding of these drivers and how they
influence the decision making process predict the probability that a specific
strategic resource will be divested? Can that understanding be used to develop a
framework that would give executives guidance on which strategic resources
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should be divested in order to create competitive advantage or minimize/eliminate
competitive disadvantage?

Competitive Advantage and the
Resource Based View
Overview

Penrose (1959) introduced, and Wernerfelt (1984) and others expanded on,
the resource based view (RBV) of the firm, in which all of a firm’s success factors
are considered resources; this view has proven a useful one for strategic analysis
(Barney, 2001). However, the model makes the implicit assumption that these
resources are sustainable, that they can be maintained over long periods of time, or
at least over periods for which strategic analysis and planning are performed.
D’Aveni (1994), D’Aveni, Dagnino and Smith (2010) contend that this is not a
realistic assumption. The definition of resources has been broadened from the
classical definition that includes tangible resources such as land, materials,
equipment, and capital, to include intangible assets such as employee skills and
capabilities and corporate processes, procedures, and traditions that contribute to
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the firm’s success. The intangible resource idea was further developed and
formalized by Grant (1996) in his paper describing the knowledge based view of
the firm.
Advancements in communication technology, increased mobility of people
across international borders to seek employment, and the reduction and elimination
of international trade barriers have resulted in freer and faster movement of
personnel, ideas, and information within and across national borders. As these
changes have accumulated and accelerated, the assumption that competitive
advantages are stable, or sustainable over strategic planning timeframes, has
become unrealistic. D’Aveni, Gagnino, and Smith (2010) have detailed the view
that all competitive advantages are temporary, and that firms need to continually
develop new advantages to replace the ones that are being replicated by
competitors. This has major implications for modern business, who can no longer
rest on their laurels, and need to continuously innovate to create new advantages if
they expect to remain leaders in their industry, or even to remain profitable. A new
set of competencies to enable continuous updating of advantages must be
developed, nurtured, and strengthened to the point where it can become the source
of a (relatively) sustainable advantage. Authors that have addressed the problem of
defining these new competencies to create relatively sustainable advantages include
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997); their paper discussed the importance of dynamic
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capabilities for wealth creation in environments of rapid technological change.
Further work by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) focused on the absorptive capacity of
a firm as the key capability enabling a firm to continuo usly develop new
advantages and gain or retain competitive position. All of these views imply that
firms with flexible resource bases will have an advantage over firms that do not,
lending support to the implementation of the asset light model.
Dynamic capabilities, the ability of a firm to continuously innovate and
outmaneuver competitors, to create multiple competitive advantages (Teece,
Pisano, Shuen, 1997), is proposed as the most sustainable of advantages. Firms
that are able to develop dynamic capabilities, and to embed those capabilities in
corporate processes and cultures will be best positioned to be successful in modern
global, hypercompetitive markets.
The RBV framework provides a robust intellectual platform upon which to
analyze competitive advantage. Although early papers on RBV (Penrose, 1959;
Wernerfelt, 1984) made the assumption that advantages are inherently sustainable;
later works (D’Aveni, et al., 2010) relaxed that assumption and suggested just the
opposite, that all advantages are, or soon will be, only temporarily sustainable as
most industries move towards perfection and intense competition, i.e.
hypercompetition (D’Aveni, 1994). The introduction of the knowledge based view
or KBV (Grant, 1996), the view that most relevant resources are increasingly
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knowledge based, explains in part the trend toward a reduction in the sustainability
of advantages: information is much more mobile than physical, or other tangible,
assets. There is a continuum of degree of sustainability of advantages both within
and across industries, but all industries are experiencing declines in the
sustainability of relevant advantages (D’Aveni, 1994).
In an era of diminished competitive advantage sustainability, firms that
wish to remain profitable must learn to develop series of temporary advantages,
creating new advantages as fast, or faster, than the old ones are being eroded. The
ability to do this has been labeled a firm’s dynamic capability (Teece, Pisano,
Shuen, 1997). Dynamic capability, since it is a complex capability that is highly
path dependent, idiosyncratic to particular firms, and exists at the organizational
and not individual level (Teece, 2007; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), is difficult for
other firms to appropriate; it can therefore be considered a relatively sustainable
competitive advantage.
Since most modern competitive advantages are knowledge based (Grant,
1996), the firm must create or acquire large amounts of relevant knowledge to
create fleeting advantages. In order for a firm to be successful creating these
advantages, knowledge must be accumulated by the firm at a rate greater than
internal invention can produce. A firm’s knowledge absorption capacity must be
developed to identify, assimilate, and convert into advantage knowledge that is
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currently held external to the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Additionally, as the
time required for strategically significant market developments becomes shorter
than strategic planning cycles, firms must increasingly rely on emergent strategic
planning, to perform strategic maneuvers in real time that were not a planned in the
last strategic planning cycle (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985).
Modern firms that can successfully create dynamic capabilities and use
those capabilities to create disruptions that competitors must respond to, and for
which the firm is uniquely positioned to exploit, enjoy a first mover advantage, and
gain a head start on competitors. Those competitors will eventually be successful
at imitating the advantage, developing a substitute advantage, or rendering the
advantage irrelevant with disruptions of their own. By that time, the dynamically
capable firm will have moved on to the next advantage; this dynamic capability
represents the most sustainable competitive advantage possible in modern high
velocity industries.

Resource based view.

In order to understand whether competitive advantage can be sustainable
from the RBV standpoint, we must define exactly what is meant by the terms
“competitive advantage”. Barney (2002a, p. 9) argues that “a firm experiences
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competitive advantages when its actions in an industry or market create economic
value and when competing firms are engaging in similar actions”. In an earlier
paper, Barney (1991) argues that a sustained competitive advantage occurs when
competitors are unable to duplicate the strategy or obtain similar results from other
strategies. O’Shannassy (2008) points out that Barney does not consider the ability
of existing competitors or new entrants to innovate and erode the strategy, implying
that, by his definition, competitive advantages are sustainable. O’Shannassy
further states that competitive advantage is not organizational performance, and
that earlier authors (Porter, 1985) fail to make the distinction. Powell (2001)
separates organizational performance from competitive advantage, and defines
competitive advantage as an input affecting organizational performance, with
organizational performance being the dependent variable. Powell’s analysis
attempts to rigorously define the concept of competitive advantage, but does not
offer a pragmatic definition that can be utilized to help managers create rents and
therefore achieve superior financial results. This study attempts to take an
academic approach to the problem of determining the sustainability of competitive
advantage, but to do so in a way that will summarize the academic literature so that
it is useful to practitioners. Powell (2001) criticizes the pragmatic approach, and
suggests that managers who are looking to identify advantages frequently see
things that are not there. However, to achieve relevance to the modern firm’s
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practices and needs, this study will adopt the definition put forth by Barney (1991),
with the relaxation of the assumption that advantages are sustainable.
Wernerfelt (1984) introduced RBV as a new way to look at the competitive
capabilities of the firm. He expanded upon the classical definition of resources as
things such as labor, capital, and land to include “brand names, in-house knowledge
of technology, employment of skilled personnel, traded contacts, machinery,
efficient procedures …. etc.” (Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 172). These are the intangible
resources described by Caves (1980).
Wernerfelt argued that profitability of a firm was dependent on resource
strength vs. competitors’ resource strengths, and that firms with significant
resource advantages would extract rents in the markets where these resource
advantages were important. He analyzed resource advantages from the viewpoint
of Porter’s five forces model (Porter, 1980), which had previously been applied to
products. Bargaining power of suppliers and customer and threat of substitutes
were lumped into a category labeled “general effects”; monopoly of supply of
resources needed by the firm, or monopoly of demand for the firm’s products are
competitive disadvantages, as is substitutability of critical resources (Wernerfelt,
1984).
Attractive resources are those resources which are valuable, rare, inimitable,
and nonsubstitutable as described in the VRIN framework (Barney, 1991).
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Wernerfelt (1984) noted several VRIN resources that contribute to competitive
advantage. Specialized machine capability, if developed internally by, or
exclusively available only to, a firm would constitute such a resource. Customer
loyalty is another VRIN resource that can function as a barrier to competitive entry
and allow rent extraction. Production experience, remaining ahead of competitors
on the learning curve, can result in a lower cost position, and technological leads
can allow a firm to enjoy a product performance, cost, or quality advantage.
Peteraf (1993) argued that these superior resource positions were the basis of any
profitability a firm may enjoy; in the absence of a significant CA, firms would
break even. Barney (2002b) states that competitive advantage results in any
profitability in excess of the cost of capital. The ability to acquire VRIN resources
through the merger and acquisition process can also result in competitive advantage
(Wernerfelt, 1984) if the acquisition can be completed at bargain costs due to
exploiting an imperfect resource market (Barney, 1986).
The VRIN framework was modified to VRIO (Barney, 2002a), where
sustainable competitive advantages are deemed to be valuable, rare, inimitable, and
organizationally exploitable. The VRIN framework implicitly assumes that the
organization that owns a VRIN resource can effectively exploit that advantage to
achieve CA; Barney’s (2002a) modification specifically mandates that the
organization understands the importance of the VRIN resource and is capable of
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utilizing in a manner that creates competitive advantage. Knott (2015) contends
that VRIO is a better tool for managers of firms to evaluate and create resources
that contribute to competitive advantage.
Wernerfelt (1984) briefly examines the dynamic properties of competitive
advantage, but only from the standpoint of being the first mover, and the creation
of resource advantages in the form of barriers to entry. He does not address the
erosion of entry barriers or competitive advantages that have been developed or
acquired. His view of competitive advantage is that once it has been built, it is a
static long lived advantage.
Barney (1991) examined and criticized precursors of RBV specifically
because those frameworks did not address sustainability of competitive advantage;
the models implied that any advantages a firm can develop or acquire would be
short lived. Barney argues that pre RBV models implicitly assume that firms
within a strategic group have equivalent strategically relevant resources and
strategies. If heterogeneities develop, they will be short lived due to learning by
rivals, organic development of equivalent resources by new entrants to the market,
and trading of resources in the strategic factor markets (Barney 1986, Hirshleifer,
1980). Barney (1991) states that RBV eliminates the homogeneity assumptions of
the earlier models, recognizing the firms possess different, sometimes unique
resources, which may be not be perfectly mobile, and can be sustainable. This is an
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important insight, as it adds to Wernerfelt’s (1984) assumption of sustainability
RBV by analyzing and describing the necessary conditions for advantages to be
sustainable.
In order for a rigorous analysis of competitive sustainable advantage to be
performed, a clear definition of “sustainable” must be agreed upon. A firm has a
sustained advantage “… when it is implementing a value creating strategy not
simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors, and
when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy”
(Barney, 1991, p. 102). Furthermore, Lippman and Rumelt (1982) contend that an
advantage cannot be considered sustained until other firms try to duplicate the
advantage and have failed; i.e. that the advantage for the firm still exists after
competitors attempts. The fact that an advantage that has existed for a long period
of time does not indicate sustainability; temporal persistence may be due to delays
by competitors in recognizing and duplicating advantages and not due to the
advantage being inimitable. A final note on the definition of sustainability is that
even sustainable advantages do not last forever; structural changes in the firm’s
industry or other environmental factors can make a previously important advantage
irrelevant, even if it cannot be duplicated by competitive efforts (Barney, 1991).
This study will assume that all competitive advantages are temporary.
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An outgrowth of RBV is the knowledge based view (KBV), a theory that
looks at firms as a collection of knowledge about technology, markets,
organizations, etc. It has been argued (Grant, 1996) that KBV is the most basic
reduction of RBV; all resources, whether they are processes, procedures, machines,
or relationships are all manifestations or applications of knowledge. This study
will not take that extreme reductionist view, but does recognize the fundamental
importance of knowledge as a resource base, and the special sustainability aspects
of knowledge, especially as it is embodied at organizational (as opposed to
individual) levels. The most important areas of a firm’s knowledge base from a
competitive advantage viewpoint are “organizational learning, the management of
technology, and managerial cognition” (Grant, 1996, p. 110).
Clearly, many of the knowledge based resources that represent, or
contribute to, competitive advantage are mobile, and therefore not sustainable.
Technology, if not protected by patents, or if owned by third parties who license
that technology to a firm, or incorporate it in products available to a firm’s
competitors, is very mobile. Individual skills (technical, management, market
foresight, etc.) can be hired away by competitors. The firm’s knowledge that
resides at the organizational level, however, is not nearly as mobile. While
organizational level knowledge can be duplicated at competing firms, it is not
nearly as easy for a competitor to acquire that knowledge as it is to acquire
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individual knowledge. Organizational knowledge is built up at firms largely via
trial and error processes, which results in solutions (procedures, relationships,
product development choices, etc.) that are highly path dependent; the knowledge
applies to the unique present circumstances of the developing firm, as well as the
historical circumstances during the knowledge development. The complexity of
the knowledge at organizational levels, as well as the unique fit to the developing
firm serve as (imperfect) barriers to competitors acquiring competitive advantage
from the same knowledge. The barriers are imperfect because determined
competitors can, through hiring of the firms key employees, observation of the
firm’s behavior, and adjustment of the knowledge acquired to their unique
situations, eventually obtain the knowledge based resource of the targeted firm.
While the difficulty of transferring knowledge (resources) between firms is
important to the sustainability of competitive advantage (Barney, 1986), the ease of
transferring knowledge within the firm is even more critical in enabling that
knowledge to become an advantage (Grant, 1996). In order for knowledge to
create an advantage, it must be disseminated widely enough within the firm to
allow it to make an impact. Grant also notes that the capacity for aggregation, and
appropriability are also conditions that must be met for knowledge to confer
competitive advantage. Capacity for aggregation is the ability of individuals and
organizations to absorb knowledge and integrate it into existing knowledge bases,
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while appropriability (the potential to be appropriated) is the ability of the
possessor of knowledge to create a return equal to the value created by the resource
(Teece, 1987; Levin. et al., 1987). Knowledge is a unique resource in that it can be
transferred between parties without being lost by the original possessor.
Knowledge can therefore be appropriated only if it can be held exclusively within
the firm and not transferred to competitors. Protection of trade secrets and patent
protections serve to raise barriers to the transfer of knowledge and make any
advantages dependent upon that knowledge more sustainable.
A resource that represents a CA, that can enable the generation of economic
rents, is defined by Amit and Shoemaker (1993) to be a strategic resource; that
resource may be physical assets such as a manufacturing facility, but may also be
an organizational capability. In a knowledge based industry, the assumption is
made that closely held knowledge, and the organizational ability to apply that
knowledge to create competitive advantage, are key components of even physical
strategic assets. The ability to buy, sell, imitate, or substitute for a particular
resource renders it much less likely to be a strategic asset (Amit & Shoemaker,
1993). Likewise, varying degrees of those abilities affect the importance of the
strategic asset.
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Temporary advantage.

As communications technology has relentlessly advanced, the cost of
maintaining worldwide, instantaneous communication has dropped dramatically.
This decrease in cost has had an equally dramatic effect on increasing information
flow across the globe. Intra- and inter- continental travel has also become cheaper
and faster, substantially increasing international personal and business travel.
Simultaneously, new free trade agreements that discourage trade barriers have led
to greatly expanded international trade and movement of labor intensive
manufacturing to low labor cost countries. Deregulation of financial and other
industries have enabled firms to compete in new industries, bringing substantial
capital and relationships to bear in building positions in those new industries.
These developments, deregulation, and the increase in global traffic of information,
people, and goods have served to lower or eliminate many of the barriers that
protect firms’ strategic resources and competitive advantages. The flow of
information (and people, acting as carriers of information/knowledge), has
decreased the ability of firms to protect trade secrets. The international flow of
goods means that most large firms now have to compete with other firms all across
the globe, and not just their home countries. The international flow of people and
capital have made the markets for labor and for firms’ products more perfect, and
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therefore reduced the ability of firms to maintain heterogeneity in resource based
advantages. These developments are all pushing strategic factor markets closer to
perfection, in which any advantages generated are quickly transferable to
competitors, making it difficult or impossible for the firm to sustain the advantages
it has developed.
In parallel to the increasing perfection of strategic factor markets, D’Aveni,
Gagnino and Smith (2010) note that the instability in markets makes specific
competitive advantages valuable only for short periods of time. Even if
competitors cannot replicate specific advantages, market forces in unstable markets
tend to make many (especially knowledge based) advantages irrelevant. D’Aveni,
et al. (2010) contend that sustaining competitive advantage is increasingly difficult,
or that at the very least, the volatile, or temporary, component of advantage is of
increasing importance with respect to the nonvolatile, or sustainable, component
(Thomas & D’Aveni, 2009). This change is most dramatic in disruptive or high
velocity environments, i.e. industries characterized by fast change such as
semiconductors, telecommunications, or other technology industries. In these
industries, most competitive advantages that can be built or acquired cannot be
sustained. In these disruptive environments D’Aveni, et al. (2010) and
Christiansen (1997) argue that the continuous innovatio n, reinvention, and
cannibalization prevent these industries from reaching maturity and equilibrium.
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D’Aveni, et al. (2010) assert that in this environment, firms must continuously
update their strategies and generate new temporary advantages continuously.
Competition in those industries has become a red queen race. This view is
consistent with the Austrian economics view that instability, disequilibrium, and
the actions of entrepreneurs prevent the formation of long term sustainable
advantages (Grimm, C. M., Lee, H., & Smith, K. G., 2005).
In these environments in which constant reinvention is necessary to retain
leadership positions, firms must make decisions to continue to invest in innovation
(new technologies, capabilities, personnel) or to squeeze as much profitability as
possible out of their current positions, and cede leadership to the competition
(D’Aveni, et al., 2010). The optimal allocation of limited financial resources is
therefore both critical to maintaining competitive advantage, and represents a
moving target. Firms that decide to give up market position free up investment
resources for other potentially more profitable uses. Those firms may invest their
resources in blue ocean opportunities (Abraham, 2006), or give themselves the
opportunity to leapfrog the competition by skipping a product generation (with the
resulting loss of revenue), and concentrating all resources on the next generation
products. The downside of this strategy is that the inevitable loss of revenue from
the skipped product generation, or gap in revenue before new markets can be
profitably exploited, can cause consternation or even panic among investors; the
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short term focus of the investment community is a strong deterrent to implementing
this type of strategy. Firms that have fewer resources with long life, inability to be
usefully applied to purposes other than their original purposes, and high capital
investment/maintenance requirements, can be more nimble, responsive to
environmental changes, and more capable of attaining first mover advantages.
Capital that is not tied up in these relatively unproductive resources can be used to
purchase, or contract for, more flexible or immediately relevant resources.
D’Aveni (1994) argues that all, or most, competitive advantages are
temporary. He puts meat on the bones of Schumpeter’s creative destruction
concept (Schumpeter, 1942) by describing many of the mechanisms responsible for
shortened competitive advantage sustainability, including, but not limited to,
technological advancements. D’Aveni argues that environmental forces of
globalization, reduced trade barriers, and international mobility of labor, capital,
and materials, have moved markets towards perfection, lowered barriers to entry,
and made competitors much more fierce and aggressive. In addition to these
developments, technological advancement and aggressive competitors have
resulted in shorter product life cycles (requiring faster development times), many
new entrants to markets, and blurring of industry boundaries. D’Aveni, channeling
Schumpeter, argues that many firms waste valuable resources in futile attempts to
defend and sustain advantages, and that firms that are successful do not concentrate
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on trying to prevent or mitigate disruption, but actively work to create it. By
creating disruptive technologies, products, and alliances, the firm is creating new
competitive advantages. If a firm can create the new advantages faster than the old
advantages are imitated or neutralized, the firm can enjoy rent generating positions
in its industry.
This shift in the timeframe of sustainability of advantages results in the
replacement of a single (or small number of) long term advantages with a series of
many short lived temporary advantages that can be strung together to create long
term above normal profitability for a successful firm, even in a hypercompetitive
environment. The hypercompetitive market favors nimble firms able to identify
opportunities and execute exploitation strategies quickly before those opportunities
expire; lack of financial investment in inflexible single purpose resources may be
an advantage for these firms, even if that lack results in higher production costs
than owning the facilities.
D’Aveni (1994) notes that industries differ in the degree to which
hypercompetition has transformed their market environments, with technology
industries being examples of those most affected. He argues, however, that
industries that are relatively stable are also seeing the effects of hypercompetit ion.
The hot sauce industry is recognized as being relatively stable and one company,
the maker of Tabasco sauce, has held a leadership position for well over one
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hundred years. However, even Tabasco’s market dominance is being eroded by
companies employing disruptive strategies. D’Aveni (1994) concludes that no
industry is immune from hypercompetition, and that the only unanswered question
is when, not if, hypercompetitive environments will be the norm in even low
velocity industries.
As market environments change quickly in unpredictable, even chaotic
fashion, it follows logically that strategic plans have a very short shelf life. Most
companies in the semiconductor industry (a representative high velocity industry
with which the author is intimately familiar) for example, make major changes to
their strategic plan annually, many even going so far as to start from scratch each
annual planning cycle. Even with annual refreshes, strategic plans are subject to
frequent revision throughout the year as strategically significant changes in the
environment unfold. It is obvious to strategic practitioners that strategic planning
has two components: planning for the expected (or at least anticipated) and reacting
to the unexpected. While some practitioners may argue that reacting to the
unexpected is tactical, not strategic, this paper will consider any changes that
impact the planned strategy to be a part of strategic planning, the convention used
by Mintzberg & Waters (1985). They formalized descriptions of various methods
of strategic planning, and detailed the difference between intended strategy, or the
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strategy that came out of the planning process, and realized strategy, which is the
strategy that the firm actually executed.
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) describe how firms generate a strategy which
changes as the environment develops. The planning process yields the intended
strategy. The parts of the intended strategy that are implemented are called the
deliberate strategy; portions of the planned strategy that do not get implemented are
labeled unrealized strategy. New strategic actions that arise after the strategic plan
has been finalized, and implemented during the time frame addressed by the
original plan, are labelled emergent strategies. The deliberate and emergent
strategies comprise the realized strategy, the strategy that is executed.
In stable industries, the realized strategy is often the same or very close to
the intended strategy. In high velocity industries (or in entrepreneurial firms,
Mintzberg & Waters, 1985), the realized strategy can be significantly different than
the intended strategy. Realized strategies across industries that exist in stagnant to
hypercompetitive environments represent a continuum of a mix from completely
deliberate to completely emergent. Decisions to build or acquire capital intensive
resources with long lives (such as production facilities) are usually a result of
intended strategies, while divestment decisions may be the result of emergent
strategies. The relative importance of emergent strategies in high velocity
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industries would suggest that divestments of resources (especially strategic
resources) would be more common in those industries.

Dynamic Capability, a Relatively Sustainable Advantage

The traditional RBV contents that firms consist of a bundle of assets and
capabilities that are idiosyncratic and difficult-to-trade, but recent analysis suggests
that those advantages only exist for a short time (Teece, 2007). Firms operating in
hypercompetitive or high velocity industries (and, at some point, firms in low
velocity industries as well) must learn to build successive temporary advantages, or
succumb to competition. Traditional RBV is based on
organizational/process/knowledge assets that enable the firm to do things better
than the competition, while the new temporary advantage assumptions stress the
importance of doing the right things. The ability to build successive temporary
advantages, to make continued choices to do the right thing, is a firm’s dynamic
capability (Teece, 2007; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). If a firm has the ability to
develop its dynamic capabilitity, i.e. a meta-level advantage that enables
continuous creation of temporary advantages, that capability can itself be
considered a relatively sustainable competitive advantage.
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Teece (2007) defines three components of dynamic capability to be the
capability: “(1) to sense and shape opportunities and threats, (2) to seize
opportunities, and (3) to maintain competitiveness through enhancing, combining,
protecting, and when necessary, reconfiguring the business enterprise’s intangible
and tangible assets” (Teece, 2007, p. 1319). Asset light strategy implementation is
the reconfiguring of tangible assets. A driving philosophy behind asset light is that
high capital cost, inflexible, relatively nonfungible assets (such as wafer fabs and
assembly and test facilities) limit a firm’s ability to strategically pivot, to turn on a
dime, and to be effectively dynamic.
The first component of dynamic capability, sensing and shaping
opportunities and threats, requires a company to be close to customers, and even
closer to competitors. The firm must develop the ability to look ahead of
customers’ current needs and competitors’ current product offerings and plans. If a
firm can be insightful enough to understand an industry’s next generation needs
and determine how to meet those needs outside the umbrella of current product and
service offerings (from the firm and from competitors), it can see opportunities to
provide customer value in the form of products and services that are outside the
firm’s and competitors’ current capabilities. The firm can then seize these newly
identified opportunities by acquiring or developing the needed capabilities to
provide value in different forms than competitors provide. Of course, any
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innovation the firm can make will eventually be understood by competitors, but the
head start, or first mover, advantage will form a temporary advantage. The firm
must then defend its advantage; although the defense is ultimately destined to fail
(no advantage can be sustained forever), it can extend the lifetime of the advantage,
and therefore the total rent extraction attributable to the advantage.
The salient question for strategic practitioners then becomes one of how to
develop Teece (2007)’s three components of dynamic capabilities. In order to
sense and shape new opportunities and threats, Teece contends that firms must
become more entrepreneurial. Entrepreneurs can have access to different
information (Kirzner, 1973), or view widely held information differently
(Schumpeter, 1934) to see new opportunities where competitors do not. Many
firms that held long term sustainable advantages become trapped by their physical
assets, processes, outlook, and corporate culture, limiting their views of future
solutions for future problems to extensions of existing capabilities, when they
should be identifying how to develop new capabilities that better solve future
problems, and are not possessed by their competitors. Firms need to replace the
dictum “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” with “if it ain’t broke, break it before our
competitors do”. Firms must learn to disrupt industries in the manner, and with the
timing of their choosing, creating opportunities in addition to recognizing them.
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The problem of quickly seizing opportunities also demands an
entrepreneurial approach; bureaucratic management structures and long approval
cycles to develop new products or enter new market segments gives competitors
more time to react, or to create different disruptions and solutions that the firm is
not prepared to counter. Creating small independent groups within large
organizations that are responsible for identifying and creating disruptions is an
organizational approach to improving the ability to seize opportunity. Funding
research in technologies that are peripheral to, but not direct extensions of, the
firm’s current technology base can render the firm more able to pivot technology
use towards previously unanticipated customer needs. A willingness to acquire
firms, purchase technology licenses, or purchase products containing key
technologies from outside the firm will also enable the firm to respond more
quickly and seize the opportunities that it can identify and/or create. When it
becomes apparent which research thread will be most fruitful, firms must act
quickly to invest heavily in that thread, to create a gap between, and then keep
ahead of, competitors (Teece, 2007).
In order to achieve Teece’s third objective, “enhancing, combining,
protecting, and when necessary, reconfiguring the business enterprise’s intangible
and tangible assets” (Teece, 2007, p. 1319), a firm must develop the ability to
integrate knowledge and technology (from external and internal sources) into the
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firm’s processes, procedures, and organizational design. In fact, when new
opportunities and technologies to exploit them are significantly different from those
with which the firm has experience and a level of comfort, it may be necessary to
form a completely new organizational structure (Teece, 2000) such as a new
division of the firm, or an independent spin off firm. In the case studied, the
semiconductor division of the parent company was indeed spun off as a separate
firm, enabling strategy development suitable to a firm in a high velocity, or
hypercompetitive, industry to be developed and implemented independently of the
parent firm operating in much lower velocity markets. Asset light model
implementation, the reconfiguration of assets, is an example of the firm adopting a
strategy more appropriate for a high velocity market.

Absorptive Capacity

All of the knowledge a firm needs to innovate cannot be generated
internally, much of it is gathered from observation of the market environment,
especially customers and competitors, but also from suppliers of contracted
services. March and Simon (1958) argue that most innovations are gathered from
external sources, not created internally, although some may be internalized through
acquisition of other firms (Ranucci & Souder, 2015). Firms must be able to gather
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and assimilate external knowledge to regularly and repeatedly innovate. In order
for a firm to continuously create new, fleeting competitive advantages in a high
velocity market, to begin Teece’s (2007) three step process, a firm must
continuously gather new information about its customers, competitors, suppliers,
and the market environment in general. Firms must “recognize the value of new,
external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990, p. 128). The ability to perform these functions is a firm’s
absorptive capacity. Firms with a larger network of suppliers increase the
opportunities to absorb supplier knowledge vs. firms with smaller supplier
networks.
When the semiconductor industry was born, and through its early history,
foundry manufacturing services were not available. By necessity, a standard model
of the semiconductor firm emerged, which included design groups, and front end
(wafer fabrication) and back end (assembly and test) manufacturing facilities. This
ownership of assets structure became an iron cage (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) that
semiconductor firms adopted out of necessity (there were no merchant suppliers of
semiconductor manufacturing services) early in the history of the industry, and
maintained due to organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984) even as
contracted manufacturing services became available. Firms that have broken out of
the iron cage by divesting manufacturing or other strategic resources and replace
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them with subcontracted resources as they implement an asset light strategy, are
creating new, wider networks of contacts that can be a source of new knowledge
relevant to the semiconductor firm’s competitive abilities. These firms have
chosen an asset strategy that, due to loss of ownership, has resulted in loss of
control and possible increases in costs, in exchange for casting the information
gathering net over a wider number of firms, organizations, and people. In a
knowledge based industry such as semiconductors, the increased knowledge that
may be harvested from the wider networks formed by off-loading manufacturing or
other services to subcontractors may be a profitable tradeoff.
The absorptive ability of a firm is dependent upon not only the ability of
individuals in the firm to absorb external knowledge, but also on the organizational
structure and processes that disseminate the knowledge throughout the organization
(assimilate), and convert it into competitive advantage (exploit it for commercial
purposes); therefore the absorptive capacity of the organization is not simply the
sum of the absorptive capabilities of the firm’s employees (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990). External knowledge can be gathered by a variety of sources such as the
sales function, or manufacturing engineers working with subcontractors, but must
be used to create temporary advantages by internal functions such as marketing and
design engineering. If the absorptive capabilities of sales people are not
assimilated by the firm’s innovation generating functions, those skills are of no use

51

to the firm. If the marketing and R&D functions of the firm receive the absorbed
knowledge, but are not able to convert it into competitive advantage (to exploit it),
the absorbed knowledge is of little or no value.
Cohen and Leveinthal (1990) note that a firm’s absorptive capabilities are
highly path dependent, that especially the assimilation and exploitation of absorbed
knowledge is influenced by the firm’s R&D history. Absorbed knowledge that is
closely related to the firm’s prior knowledge will be much more effectively
exploited; as the firm continues to add new relevant knowledge through invention
and absorption, the amount and breadth of external knowledge that can be exploited
continues to grow. Both effective invention and prior absorption increase a firm’s
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).

Limits of Classical MNE Theoretical View
Early studies of internationalization (Caves, 1982; Porter, 1990) found that
firms begin as purely domestic operation in their home countries, and expand
internationally in a predictable manner, usually after saturating their home country
markets. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) introduced the Uppsala model, which
describes the process as beginning with export, progressing to selling through
agents, then selling through the firm’s subsidiaries (with varying degrees of
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equity/ownership), and finally producing in the target country. A feedback path
whereby foreign knowledge enables initial foreign entry through exporting, which
creates new knowledge enabling foreign partnerships then foreign direct investment
(FDI), is used to explain the sequential process. A firm proceeds to the next level
of international operations as their knowledge of the target country increases, and
the model implies that firms with international operations short of production were
in the intermediate stages of internationalization. In the year of publication, this
model was empirically supported for most multinational enterprises (MNEs), and is
still an accurate generic history of many of today’s MNEs. Johanson and Vahlne
(2009) update their model to refine the concept of knowledge of the target country
as a set of networks. This redefinition of the driver of internationalization
essentially reiterates the possibility of subcontracting the acquisition and storage of
local knowledge to foreign partners, but still models the internationalization
process as sequential with the terminal stage being foreign production through
wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS). Both works stress the increasing importance of
knowledge as a key competitive advantage.
The sequential view of internationalization does not necessarily predict that
every firm that conducts foreign operations will work through the entire process
and reach the terminal, FDI in WOS, stage. Buckley and Casson (1998) propose a
model for foreign market entry that takes into account “Location costs,
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internalizations factors, financial variables, cultural factors, such as trust and
psychic distance, market structure and competitive strategy, adaptation costs (to the
local environment), and the cost of doing business abroad” (Buckley and Casson,
1998, p. 543). The model defines twelve entry strategies based on the quoted
conditions, and treats production and distribution separately. Although the model
addresses entry modes, changing environmental conditions may indicate different
optimum operating modes for firms already internatio nally established. This view
may be useful in predicting divestment (or indicating divestment as an optimal
strategy) as changing conditions shift the optimum entry mode from, for example,
direct FDI to subcontracting of production. However, the model does not appear to
be intended to predict shifting strategy optimization in a dynamic environment, so
caution is appropriate in justifying generalization to the dynamic case.
Agarwal and Rami (1992) also propose a model of foreign market entry
choice that depends on three broad factors: ownership advantages, location
advantages, and internalization advantages. The market and firm specific factors
indicate the likelihood that the internationally expanding firm will choose enter
foreign markets through exporting, licensing, IJV, or WOS. This model shares the
same weakness in explaining divestment as the Buckley and Casson (1998) model,
namely that it is an entry mode decision tool, and does not address changing
strategies in a dynamic environment. These internationalization entry mode choice

54

models provide a theoretical basis upon which to begin to build theories to help us
understand the dynamic case.
Other authors (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004; Oviatt & McDougal, 2005) also
address forms of control over foreign based resources by means other than
ownership. The work of these authors address firms that are born global, being
founded as MNEs or becoming MNEs within three years of firm inception. While
these studies do not specifically address divestment of existing manufacturing
facilities, they do address controlling rather than owning these critical resources.
New ventures lack the financial resources to acquire or build foreign
operations, but the increasingly global nature of business has resulted in the
widespread availability of people with international business experience (Oviatt &
McDougal, 2005). Similar relevant factors that determine the structure of
international operations for new ventures (limitation of resources as compared to
the established companies and the extensive international business experience of
employees) also apply to medium sized semiconductor companies (limitation of
resources as compared to the industry leaders, and extensive international
experience) and may drive similar choices of international structures. The
structures of choice for most international new ventures is the network; while
networks do not internalize market transactions, cooperation and trust within the
network can reduce opportunism, a major component of the cost of arm’s length
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relations (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Larson, 1992). A close, long term, and
mutually beneficial partnership is an example of a network relationship that can
minimize the costs of opportunism.
Hypercompetitive industries are characterized by very short time periods
over which competitive advantages can be exploited before being destroyed by
competitors (D’aveni, 1994). In these industries, firms move very quickly to create
differentiation, while their competitors move equally quickly to match or leapfrog
the differentiation. Pricing for products with a base set of customer values declines
quickly as higher value products are offered at price points similar to the products
with the base value set. In this environment, the ability to be nimble, to understand
customer wants and needs are critical (Drucker, 1985), especially if those wants
and needs can be identified even before the target customers are aware of them.
The entrepreneurial willingness to take risks can result in first mover advantages,
but can also result in products that fail to correctly match market needs. In this
situation, low investment, and the ability to quickly pivot to alternative products
and strategies are can be an important competitive advantage (or in the case of
industries where this pattern is the norm, can eliminate a competitive
disadvantage). Firms that exhibit international marketing and international
entrepreneurial orientations are able to leverage foreign distributor competencies to
achieve superior business results (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004). This argument can be
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generalized to include foreign production competencies. Leveraging, rather than
owning, assets with high capital requirement dramatically reduces the impact of
failing products or strategies, and allow firms to survive and continue to innovate.
Firms that own capital intensive investments cannot easily shed those resources
when their strategy fails, while firms that leverage those same resources can
quickly pivot to alternative resources to support alternative strategies. This view
also contains the seeds of a production facility divestment explanation.
The decision to divest is qualitatively different than greenfield investment
decisions because FDI is somewhat sticky: the factors driving divestment must be
significant enough to overcome the inertia of continuing to operate the foreign
subsidiary as has been done in the past. Some of this stickiness is due to the fact
that divestiture is seen as an admission of failure, and firms therefore are hesitant to
divest and often do not publicize divestment actions (Benito, 1997). Asset
specificity, the inability to find valuable alternate uses, can also render the resource
non fungible and inhibit the ability of the firm to divest (Caves & Porter, 1976).
Justification for divestment therefore generally must meet a higher standard than
that for investment.
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Transaction Cost Economics

It has long been thought that the understanding of the organization of the
firm can best be achieved by viewing corporate governance as a series of
contractual relations (Commons, 1932; Williamson, 2010). Building on the work
of Arrow (1969), who analyzes contractual versus internal sources of supply,
Williamson (1971) expanded that view by stating that there are three basic models
for the procurement of supplies: a long term once-for-all contract, a series of short
term contracts, and vertical integration. He introduces the concept of transaction
cost as part of his justification of vertical integration and contends that there are
costs associated with contractual transactions between firms that are not borne by
firms who complete the same transactions entirely within the firm; firms that
vertically integrate enjoy a cost advantage. Supplier/customer disagreements in
vertically integrated firms are decided by executive decisions within the firm
(Whinston, 1964), a much quicker and less expensive alternative than interfirm
negotiation or litigation. Vertical integration provides, among other advantages, a
cost savings over comparable nonintegrated firms. Vertically integrated firms
eliminate the costs associated with negotiation, as well as capturing margins/profits
of the integrated firm; his reasoning applies to purchases of physical goods as well
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as purchases of services (Williamson, 1971, 1979, 1991).
Williamson (1971) goes on to describe the limitations of long term
contracts, such as changing needs driven by technological developments, the
inability of the contracting parties to accurately predict these changes, and the
resultant inadequacy of the long term contract to provide a satisfactory deal for all
parties bound by the contract as technologies or other circumstances change. The
use of short term contracts can address this issue, but at the expense of agility –
firms that must renegotiate supply of goods or services in a fast changing
hypercompetitive market environment face delays that may limit or eliminate first
mover advantages. Complex contracts, whether short or long term, are also
incomplete, leading to the need for further negotiation to cover eventualities that
were not accounted for in the contract (Williamson, 2002, 2010a). The proposed
solution for these limitations of contractual arrangements is their elimination by
internalizing the transaction through vertical integration (Williamson, 2002, 2008,
2009). Empirical studies by Geyskins, et al. (2006) and by Macher and Richman
(2008) determined that TCE had the power to predict vertical integration activity,
lending credence to the TCE view.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory suggests vertical integration is a
viable method for reducing costs and minimizing the time required to change
supply agreements previously governed by contract in imperfect (i.e. actual, real
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world) markets (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Whinston (2001) proposes a property
rights theory as an outgrowth of transaction cost economics to explain vertical
integration; his key addition to TCE that is applicable to the decision to vertically
integrate (or not) is the recognition that physical ownership of assets limits the
ability of the firm to be opportunistic. In a hypercompetitive market, the ability to
change course quickly as unforeseen opportunities arise can be a significant
competitive advantage, which hints at a justification for asset light theory.

Divestment Theory View

In one of the early studies to analyze divestment of FDI for strategic reasons
Boddewyn (1979), noted the increasing rate of divestment from the 1960’s vs. late
1970’s. (McDermott, 2010 pointed out that this may be, at least in part, due to the
increasing rate of foreign investment during the same time period.) His study
focused on divestiture due to financial performance or strategic fit issues; although
strategic fit does not obviously apply directly to the case of semiconductor firms
(wafer fab and packaging are core activities of a semiconductor manufacturing
firm, and the facilities’ financial performance was competitive), it does address
firm strategy as being a driver of divestment, and more subtle strategic effects may
be in play. He specifically states that one financial justification for divestment is
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“…. lack of capital to finance the modernizations or expansion necessary to
survive” (Boddewn, 1979, pg. 22), which directly addresses one of the proposed
drivers of divestment in this study. Benito (1997, 2005) and McDermott (2010)
also note that strategic fit, or lack thereof, can be a factor encouraging divestment,
as can be economic/financial conditions and governance problems. The resources
indentified as strategic assets in the study are wafer fab, assembly and test, circuit
design and fab process design; all of these are core competencies of semiconductor
firms and are central strategic capabilities. If a firm divests an internal ability to
perform any of these functions, the function must be replaced by contractual
relationships.
For semiconductor firms who chose to divest established, well run, efficient
resources, the strategic and financial viewpoints will be most productive (Tan &
Gershwin, 2004). Benito (2005) adopts this approach; he introduces an integrationresponsiveness model that analyzes firm strategy in light of dynamic environments
and presents divestment as an appropriate response in certain environments. He
notes several environmental conditions under which divestment is appropriate
including decline of the industry, obsolescence of production facilities, and
increasing costs (especially labor costs) that are not necessarily relevant to the
semiconductor firms being studied. However, the integration-response model
includes economies of scale and scope (the integration part of the model) which
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appear to be important factors. While the firm loses some economies of scope and
other internalization advantages when divesting production facilities, if those
facilities are integrated into a larger manufacturing firm, the resulting economies of
scale may be enough to overcome the lost internalization advantages.
Boddewyn (1985) states that there are few real differences between foreign
investment and divestment decisions, and that both are driven by capital
requirements, strategic attractiveness, organizational or behavioral tendencies, and
resource allocation priorities. He proposed a framework for understanding foreign
divestment that required the divestment be “possible, beneficial, and triggered”
(quoted in McDermott, 2010, p. 47). This approach is best suited to studying the
semiconductor industry divestiture phenomenon. Boddewyn (1983) specifically
noted that foreign divestiture would occur when the foreign facility no longer
creates a net competitive advantage, it is no longer profitable to internalize the
competitive advantage the foreign facility represents, or that the internalization is
no longer profitable in the particular host country. For the semiconductor industry,
the relevant characteristic is whether the foreign facility will provide a net
competitive advantage over the depreciable life of the investment required, or
conversely, whether the investment required to maintain the facility in a state which
represents a competitive advantage is superior to other possible investments that
can be made with the same funds.
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The Asset-Light Model
In their investigation of the drivers of firms’ sustained superior
performance, Tang and Liou (2010) identify sustainable competitive advantage,
configuration, dynamic capability, and sustainable superior performance as being
interrelated variables. (While the inclusion of sustained superior performance in
the list may appear tautological, the authors address past performance influencing
future performance.) Porter (1985) notes that there are two broad categories of
advantage, cost and differentiation; the firm’s configuration of capital assets impact
both factors. The asset light approach addresses the firm’s capital asset
configuration.
Asset light is a model of strategic resource configuration that emphasizes
the firm’s leverage, rather than ownership, of some strategic capital resources.
Firms implementing an asset light strategy outsource activities in the value chain
that are not core strengths of the firm (Surdu, 2011) to other firms that can perform
those activities more efficiently, or in some other superior manner. The firm “aims
at minimizing physical resources while making effective use of what remains to
increase the profitability of the firm” (Liu, 2011, p. 953). This strategy can result
in financial benefits, including improvement of financial ratios such as return on
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assets, and reduction of credit expense (if assets are divested and the proceeds used
for debt retirement) and improved corporate valuation (Padmanabhan, 1993). The
strategy can also result in real operational benefits enabled by freeing up
management attention spent on capital asset management and making more cash
available for firms to apply to core competencies such as product development and
marketing. Implementing an asset light or capital light approach can be good
strategy. “Focusing the investment of capital on those assets where a company’s
expertise lets it earn the best return for investors is simply to be capital efficient.”
(Maly & Palter, 2002, pg. 1).
The asset light model, by reducing capital investment, can also reduce risk
due to uncertainty (Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987; Collis, 1990; Sohn, 2014).
Business cycle fluctuations can cause reduction of demand that may result in
underutilization of capital resources; a firm that contracts for the services provided
by those resources will not be impacted by the financial penalties of
underutilization, while a firm that owns the capital resource will. Industry
disruptions may make some capital resources obsolete, or in other ways reduce
their value. Clearly, firms adopting asset light capital strategies reduce their
exposure to capital underutilization and obsolescence risks.
The asset light model has been successfully applied to several diverse
industries successfully. Page (2007) and Sohn (2013) note the adoption of the asset
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light approach in the sale and lease-back of hotel properties. Page (2007) identifies
several factors such as the low cost of money, shortage of commercial investment
real estate, and shareholder demands for reduction of capital from the balance
sheets influencing this trend, but both authors contend that the major advantages of
the approach are the reduction of risk, and the ability of the hotel operators to focus
on hotel operations rather than ownership of real estate. Reduction of capital and
risk are factors that apply across industries. Firms in the telecommunications,
semiconductor, chemical, and hotel industries have adopted an asset light model
with similar justifications. In each of the cases noted, firm financial performance
benefitted (Liou, 2011; Surdu, 2011).
Liou, Tang, and Huang (2008) specifically address the asset light model in
the semiconductor industry. They propose four generic dimensions of competitive
advantage: customer relationships, supplier relationships, knowledge property, and
fixed asset management. Utilizing the VRIN and VRIO definitions of competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991, 2002a; Knott, 2015)), they suggest the linking of
competitive advantage to sustained superior financial performance of firms is not a
hard and fast causal relationship (Priem & Butler, 2001), but that competitive
advantage merely increases the probability of superior financial performance
(Powell, 2001). Heterogeneity among the quality, importance, and VRIN/VRIO
properties of the firm’s resources are the source of competitive advantage (or
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competitive disadvantage) that makes superior (or inferior) financial performance
probable (Tang & Liou, 2007). The du Pont identity (return on invested capital, or
ROIC) is used as the measure of superior firm performance (Grant, 1991; Firer,
1999). The use of ROIC as the measure of firm performance (which is a proxy for
competitive advantage and vice versa) strongly implies the importance of an asset
light strategy; reducing invested capital lowers the denominator in the ROIC
calculation, while reallocating capital investment to more productive uses increased
the numerator. Both of these actions associated with implementation of an asset
light strategy will improve calculated ROIC, and provide a firm level justification
for the strategy. Using the ROIC performance metric, Liou, Tang, and Huang
(2008) note that the top five performing semiconductor firms in their study’s
sample have very low levels of capital (they are predominantly design firms, and
contract for production services), while the lowest performing firms own their
production facilities, which results in very high capital investment levels. In the
notoriously cyclical semiconductor industry, firms that expect to meet demand
when the market is hot must overinvest in capital assets (especially production
facilities) in order to take advantage of high demand, with the penalty of having
underutilized capital assets when demand slows. These capital heavy firms are
therefore periodically financially burdened by capacity underutilization.
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A study of the fortunes of the Japanese semiconductor industry, and the loss
of over half of its global market share by Wen, Huang, Cheng (2012) compares the
strategies of firms with an integrated device manufacture (IDM) model that own
their production facilities, and the pure manufacturing outsourcing (PMO) model,
where the firm does not own any manufacturing capability. Some IDMs do all of
their manufacturing in firm owned facilities, while the asset light firms do some
manufacturing in firm owned facilities and also subcontract for a substantial
portion of their manufacturing needs. The PMO and asset light model firms
depend on wafer foundries to provide the wafer fabrication services and packaging
subcontractors for their assembly and test services to meet all or some of their
manufacturing needs. This arrangement allows the PMO and asset light firms to
avoid the extremely high investment required to maintain modern, competitive
wafer fabs (Vajpayee & Dhasmana, 2011; Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Corp, 2010, 2016). The firms providing wafer foundry services, in part by
consolidating demand from many different semiconductor firms, are able to enjoy
economies of scale that would not be attainable by individual semiconductor firms.
The Japanese firms did not maintain cost competitive wafer fab facilities
due to delayed investment, and were slow to adopt the asset light or PMO models
being adopted in the US and the rest of Asia. These inactions resulted in a loss of
cost competitiveness, lower margins, and global market share (Wen, Huang,
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Cheng, 2012). A notable empirical study (Lin & Huang, 2011) evaluated a global
sample of semiconductor firms and found that those firms employing the asset light
strategy had superior return on book value, return on assets, and value of assets as
compared to more asset heavy firms. Clearly the asset light capital allocation
strategy can be successfully implemented in the semiconductor industry, and firms
that continue with the traditional wholly owned manufacturing resources are, in
many cases, penalized for failure to adopt an asset light strategy.
Asset light literature is firmly grounded in the competitive advantage and
RBV literature, and explains, at the firm level, justifications for divestment of
certain strategic resources that are not explained by the IB, transaction cost, or
divestment literature. The asset light literature does not, however, currently
address the drivers of the decisions of exactly which resources are divested.
Understanding the impact of these drivers of the decisions should aid the
understanding of why certain strategic resources in the semiconductor industry are
divested, while others are not.

Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview and Description of the problem

Firms trying to create competitive advantage, especially those in
hypercompetitive industries, are constantly evaluating their mix of resources to
determine if those resources represent an optimum mix and do indeed create
competitive advantage. The asset-light model is a firm capital structure that
reduces major capital assets and has been adopted across several disparate
industries including semiconductors, telecommunications, and hotels (Page, 2007;
Liu, Tang, & Huang, 2008; Liu, 2011; Surdu, 2011; Sohn, 2013). By reducing
capital assets, especially those that no longer generate significant competitive
advantages, financial resources can be redirected to the firms’ unique capabilities
that do have the ability to generate competitive advantage (Maly & Palter, 2002).
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The literature provides explanation for the reasoning behind implementation
of an asset light capital model, but does not address the reasons why some strategic
resources are divested, while others are not. This study aims to determine the
specific drivers of strategic resource divestment decisions made while firms
implement asset light capital models. Identification of these drivers, and
understanding the impact of the state of the drivers on the divestment decisions will
advance the understanding of the details of implementation of the asset light model.

Worldview – Interpretive Framework

The study of business strategy is, at its heart, the study of human behavior
in the context of a firm attempting to maximize its profitability. Strategic decisions
are made by groups of individuals with different backgrounds, knowledge, and
biases. The impact of those decisions, the profitability of the firm, is heavily
influenced by these strategic decisions, but macroeconomic factors, luck, chance
encounters, and other random factors can also significantly impact firm
profitability. The random events affecting profit outcomes and unique and diverse
backgrounds of the individuals contributing to the strategic resource divestment
decisions result in hazy cause and effect relationships between strategic decisions
and profit outcomes. Various participants may see these relationships quite
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differently; the worldview of an investment banker, a production planner, a
business unit head, and a CEO are significantly different. If each of these
individuals contribute to the divestment decision process, each brings unique
assumptions and goals to that process. This suggest an ontological outlook that
there is not one single objective reality to be discovered, but that multiple realities
or worldviews must be considered (Creswell, 2013).
The epistemological questions regarding the nature of knowledge in this
study reduce to identification of the factors that drive the divestment of strategic
resource decisions, and the determination of the effect of the state of those drives
on the decisions made. In order to determine these drivers and their states, it is
necessary to get close to the participants in the study in order to create a deep
understanding of their view of the drivers, their relative importance, and effect on
divestment decisions (Cresswell, 2013).
The research conducted in this study will attempt to understand drivers of
divestment decisions in order to predict the probability of divestment of a particular
strategic resource, or the advisability of that divestment, i.e. whether executing the
divestment will result in greater profitability for the firm. It will utilize an
interpretive framework based in pragmatism, attempting to explain and predict
divestment behavior while recognizing the limited explanatory power of existing
theory (Creswell, 2013).
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Research questions

This study aims to identify the factors driving the decision to divest
strategic resources in the hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based
semiconductor industry, and impact of the state of those drivers. Specifically:

1) What are the drivers of specific strategic resource divestment decisions in
the semiconductor industry?
2) Can the state of the drivers and the characteristics of the resource be used to
predict the probability or advisability of strategic resource divestiture in the
semiconductor industry?

Qualitative vs. Quantitative approach

The goal of this study is to determine the factors driving the decisions to
divest strategic resources in the semiconductor industry, and the effect of the state
of those drivers on specific divestment decisions. This is an open ended question;
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there is not a solid hypothesis that will be proven or disproven. There are not
specific, identified factors whose effects will be measured. The nature of the study,
the search for a model with explanatory power, requires a qualitative approach
(Reswick, 1994).

Research Design - Discussion of Types of
Qualitative Approaches

The five qualitative approaches as described by Creswell (2013) are
narrative, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study. Each of
these approaches are appropriate for various qualitative studies, and were
considered for this study. A very brief discussion of the characteristics of each
approach and its’ applicability to the study of the divestment of strategic resources
in the semiconductor industry follows.
The narrative approach concentrates on telling the story of one or two
individuals (Creswell, 2013). The goal of this study is to understand the factors
driving divestment, and the stories of one or two individuals may provide important
insight. However, the variation in experience, biases, and viewpoints of the various

73

people involved in major strategic decisions in modern firms, and the need to
understand those multiple viewpoints, would make the selection of only one or two
viewpoints a risky approach. The narrative approach does not appear to be a
productive path for this study, and it will not be utilized.
The ethnographic approach focusses on describing shared cultural
experiences (Creswell, 2013). Although firms can be described as having a
corporate culture that is shared by all or most employees of the firm, (Chaudry, et
al. 2016; Schein, 2010), the diversity of backgrounds and viewpoints of the
decision makers and those who are impacted by strategic resource divestment
decisions is an important component of the study. The goal of the study is to
understand the drivers of divestment decisions, not on the common meaning or
experience of the firm’s employees. Thus, the ethnographic approach is not well
suited for this study.
The grounded theory approach attempts to build an understanding of a
phenomenon that allows the generation of a theoretical framework that will explain
the observed phenomenon and provide predictive power in the future (Corbin &
Strauss, 2007; Creswell, 2013; Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This
study is attempting to develop a model of the strategic resource divestment decision
that includes identification of the drivers of the decision, and the effects of the
states of those drivers on the decision made. The study attempts to expand or build

74

upon existing theory rather than develop completely new theory. Grounded theory
is related to, and may inform the methodology used in this study, but it is not the
best description of the methodology employed in the study.
The phenomenological approach “describes the common meaning of several
individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or phenomenon” (Creswell,
2013, p. 76). This method has the advantage of accommodating the viewpoints of
more individuals than the narrative approach, and thereby enabling the reduction of
risk of bias associated with a sample of a very small number of individuals in an
attempt to represent multiple viewpoints. The focus of the phenomenological
approach is on the meaning of a phenomenon on those individuals; this study does
indeed utilize the phenomenological approach, as we are investigating the thinking
of several individuals making a major strategic resource decision. Even though the
decision is made on behalf of the stockholders of a large corporation, there was a
small group of decision makers that had to reach consensus for action and had a
shared, lived experience.
Case study based research address a specific, contemporary example of a
case that is illustrative and representative of the concept being studied (Stake, 1995;
Yin, 2009). The decision to divest a major strategic asset is a complex one; many
financial, technical, and organizational dynamics (social) issues influence the
decision. The case study approach fits the research problem well, and appears to be
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a fruitful avenue for gaining insight into the drivers of divestment decision study
“…. the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand
complex social phenomena. In brief, the case study method allows investigators to
retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events” (Yin, 2009,
pg.4). A case that appears to be representative and illustrative, a medium size
semiconductor firm that has divested a strategic resource (a manufacturing facility
in a low labor cost Asian country) has been identified, and several current and
former employees of the firm have been interviewed. Formal authorization from
the firm to interview current and past employees regarding the divestment has been
granted.

Population Studied and Sample

The population that is being studied is the semiconductor industry. This
population is a significant target of study in itself, but it may also be representative
of other hypercompetitive, capital intensive, and/or knowledge based industries.
Although this study does not assume the results gathered from the semiconductor
industry are generalizable to other, similar industries, further research may support
generalizability.
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The phenomenological approach utilizing case study techniques was
executed, hence a single medium sized semiconductor firm comprises the firm level
sample. Within the firm, a variety of individuals including senior executives
responsible for major strategic decisions (including the divestiture of strategic
resources such as foreign production facilities), and executives and manager
impacted by those decisions were included in the sample.
The researcher interviewed a majority of the seven key decision makers
responsible for the divestment decision (five top executives at the firm studied),
and a small number of executives impacted by the decision. Due to such a small
number of decision makers, the total sample size is necessarily small. For a
phenomenological study, Polkinghorne (1989) recommends five to twenty five
interviews, while the literature for case study sample sizes gives less specific
guidance. For a case study (or other qualitative studies utilizing interviews), the
concept driving sample size is that of saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). A
sample size should be large enough that the addition of new interviews does not
add anything to the understanding of the concept being studied (Mason, 2010).
A total of seven interviews have been completed, meeting the requirements
for phenomenological study recommended by Polkinghorne (1989). The responses
for the drives of the decision to divest, and the condition or state of those drivers
were remarkably consistent, both among the decision makers and by those
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impacted by the decision. The interviewees stated that the decision team reached
consensus to divest the assembly and test facility, and that the firm communicated
the decision and its rationale openly to the executive and management staff, which
explains the consistency. The saturation requirement for qualitative interviews
appears to have been met as well.

Choice of participants
This dissertation details a phenomenological study utilizing a case study
approach to understand the reasons for reaching a divest or retain decision for
strategic resources in the semiconductor industry. The time available for the
research is not unbounded. A tradeoff had to be made in the choice of participants
between casting the net wide to gather the relevant information on many decisions
from several firms, or drilling deeply into a small number of decisions at a single
firm. The intent of the research is to generate a deep understanding of a
phenomenon that has not been described in the literature, favoring the drill deep at
a single firm strategy. By reaching a deeper understanding of the factors driving
divest or retain decisions at a single firm, the parameters of future study can be
narrowed, enabling the design of a survey instrument that can be disseminated to a
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larger group than can be personally interviewed within reasonable time constraints.
The drilling deep approach is a prelude to future, wider, quantitative study.
The study has gathered primary data through semi-structured interviews
with executives at the studied firm with the intent to gather information on:
interviewees’ motivations - why the divest or retain decision was reached;
awareness and knowledge - what is the state of the drivers of the decisions; and
attitude and opinion - was the decision the correct one (Ghauri & Grønehaug,
2010). Study participants were chosen based on their participation in the resource
divestment decisions, or on their exposure to the effects of those decisions, their
responsibilities for strategic management of their product lines, and knowledge of
the state of the drivers identified. The participants in the decision have provided
valuable insight into the specific factors driving the decision, while those exposed
to the effects have been able to provide insight into the wisdom or advisability of
the decision. The inclusion of these two different groups providing both predivestment and post-divestment analysis of the decisions is intended to enable a
more complete understanding of the decision. It is possible that that the inclusion
of views by those affected by the decision may enable feedback to practitioners that
can be used to modify evaluation of the drivers considered in the decision making
process.

79

Decision participants interviewed consist of the top level management of
the firm at the time of the decision. Those affected by the decision include senior
business unit executives who depend on the capabilities of the resources to run their
respective business, and are responsible for the management of captive and
subcontracted resources. A total of nine executives targeted for interviews were
contacted. Only two did not agree to participate in the study, each because he felt
he did not have enough exposure to the decision or its impact to make useful
contributions. One of those two left the firm shortly before the divestment decision
was made, the other joined the firm after the divestment had been completed.

Instrumentation, Procedures, Data Collection
In order to fully understand the question being studied, Creswell (2013)
recommends interviews with individuals with direct knowledge of the phenomenon
being studied. The interviews were semi-structured and flexible (Charmaz, 2014);
the initial questions are open ended, asking interview subjects for their thoughts on
the important drivers of divestment decisions. After the interviewees gave their
impression of the important drivers they were asked whether specific drivers
proposed by the author of this study are also important. The order of these
questions is critical; it is important to gather the unprompted responses regarding
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the important drives before the interview subjects hear specific proposed drivers
that may influence their thought process.
Interviews were conducted both in person and by telephone calls. While in
person interviews were preferred, remote location of many of the interview subjects
and logistical limitations on travel by the researcher necessitated the use of
telecommunications. All of the initial interviews were audio recorded and
transcribed, with the full knowledge and consent of the interview subjects. All of
the interviewees agreed to be available for followup questions, and were contacted
by phone or email to clarify points raised in the interviews, or to provide more
information on the details of the strategic planning process that resulted in the
divestment decision. . Specific resource allocation decisions, and details of the
strategic planning process for the firm were investigated through these followup
communications. While the followup phone calls were not recorded, important
points from those discussions were manually noted by the researcher; most of the
information requested in the followup calls was very specific, and easily recorded
manually in table format. The interviewees were more relaxed and possibly more
candid without the calls being recorded.
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Data Analysis
Interviewees were asked to identify the firm’s strategic resources, and the
drivers of the decision to divest or retain those resources. Transcriptions of the
interviews were analyzed and selectively coded to generate a list of strategic
resources for the firm and propositions defining the drivers of divestment decisions
(Creswell & Brown, 1992; Creswell, 2013). Examples of strategic resources that
may be identified include production facilities, design groups, and patent portfolios.
The interviewees’ answers to the drivers questions were coded by creating
categories of drivers described in their responses. Examples of categories that were
identified include the firm’s financial distress/need for cash, resource’s contribution
to continuing competitive advantage, funding requirements to maintain competitive
advantage, and ability to contain the firm’s intellectual property within the
resource.
The state of identified drivers for the identified strategic resources has been
analyzed in light of the divestment decisions made (assembly and test facility
divested, other strategic resources not divested). The most important drivers were
identified based on whether they were identified by most decision makers, and
whether the states of the drivers were consistent with the divest (or not) decision
reached for the resource. A model detailing the advisability of divestment based on
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the state of drivers for resources that may be generalizable to other semiconductor
firms, or to firms in other hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based
industries.

Ethical Considerations
The researcher has contacted the subject of the case study and received
formal permission to interview its employees that agree to be interviewed. This
permission has been documented via email. The person who has granted
permission for the interviews is the Vice President/General manager responsible for
the division of the firm that includes the current employees being interviewed. The
firm that is the subject of the study will not be identified (other than the description
of the firm as “a medium size semiconductor company”, and the information that
the firm divested a manufacturing facility in a low labor cost Asian country), and
the employees will be identified only by a general description of their position or
responsibility at the time of the divestment decisions. Employees, and former
employees of the firm were asked to sign a consent letter that outlines the efforts
made to protect their interests and protect them from harm (see Appendix B).
Recordings of interviews were made only after the interview subject explicitly
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consent and the recordings document their consent. Every effort has been made to
protect the interview subjects from any adverse effect of participating in the study.

Population and sample
The population interviewed consists of senior executives at the target firm
who participated in the divestment decision, and senior executives responsible for
business operations that were significantly impacted by the divestment. Senior
executives at the investment bank handling the firm’s pending initial public stock
offering who participated in, or influenced, the reconfiguration of the firm’s
strategic assets were not able to be contacted, and their viewpoints are represented
by the senior executives who participated in the decision and worked closely with
them to reach the divestment decision.
The sample consists of representatives from the management of the firm
that is the subject of this study, with emphasis on including as many of the decision
makers for the divestment decision as possible. Of the seven key decision makers
identified by the firm’s top managers, four were interviewed. All of the target
firm’s executives contacted agreed to be interviewed, and were enthusiastic about
participating in the research.
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Selection of participants
Participants were chosen to participate based on their membership in one of
the groups comprising the studied population. Initial discussions with decision
participants identified the decision makers; interviewees were also asked to identify
members of the other population groups. Identified potential participants were
approached informally to determine whether they were willing to be interviewed,
and all who could be contacted agreed to participate and their consent documented.

Risks to participants and protections
There is little or no risk to the participants in the study; the only identified
risk would be current employees inadvertently releasing proprietary or company
secret information, which the firm would perceive negatively. This slight risk is
specifically identified in the consent letter that interview participants are being
asked to sign.
The participants were asked for their recollections of the process of a
divestment decision that was made almost two decades ago. Many of the interview
subjects are now retired, and the interviews are being conducted with the
knowledge and consent not only of participants, but of the firm being studied. In a
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hypercompetitive industry such as semiconductor manufacturing, sensitive data is
almost always recent, and the temporal distance from the event being studied make
it unlikely any sensitive information will be communicated. Transcripts of the
interviews were furnished to the interview subjects, and they were given the
opportunity to redact any sensitive information. The identity of specific
interviewees has been protected through the use of generic population segment
descriptors (e.g. senior executive/decision maker, manager/decision implementer,
etc.); no personally identifying information will be reported. The firm being
studied will not be identified.

Researcher Positionality
The researcher is a 30 year veteran of the semiconductor industry, employed
by the semiconductor firm from which this case is drawn from 1983-2013, in
engineering, management, and executive roles. He has extensive knowledge of
semiconductor technology, and was responsible for strategic planning for a
business unit of a semiconductor firm, and for that business unit’s profitability
performance. He is personally known to the interview subjects. He was not
directly nor indirectly involved in the decision to divest that is being studied in this
case.
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Validity
The goal of this study is to understand and model the effect of the factors
(ability to generate competitive advantage, capital investment requirements, ability
to contain IP, and others that emerged during the study) on divestiture of strategic
resources in a hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based industry. A
case study of a semiconductor firm’s divestiture decisions for the major strategic
resources common to semiconductor manufacturing firms is used as evaluation
vehicle. In order for the study to be valid, semiconductor manufacturing must
indeed be a hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based industry; if the
results are to be generalized, the semiconductor industry must also be
representative of other hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based
industries.
The semiconductor industry is specifically identified as an example of a
hypercompetitive industry (D’Aveni, 1994), and modern wafer fabs cost well over
$1 billion to build and equip (Vajpayee & Dhasmana, 2011; Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Corp, 2010); clearly semiconductor manufacturing is a
hypercompetitive, capital intensive industry. Competitive advantage is determined
by the ability to design circuits and processes that enable superior product
performance and/or cost structures. R&D spending in the industry is high, and
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considered crucial to firm success (United Business Media, 2005) strongly
supporting the classification of the industry as knowledge based. In the absence of
any indication that semiconductor manufacturing is atypically hypercompetitive,
capital intensive, or knowledge based, results may be generalizable to similar
industries, providing an avenue for further study.
The research was conducted as a series of semistructured interviews; the
instrument is a questionnaire (see appendix B) that was designed to elicit open
ended responses from the interview subjects before asking whether specific items
were drivers of the divestment decision. This was done in an attempt to gather the
thoughts of the interviewees before they were exposed to any suggestions from the
researcher, and eliminate (or at least minimize) any effects due to researcher bias.
The questionnaire was reviewed by Dr. Emily Martinez-Vought, a research
methods expert, and Dr. Enrique Perez, a subject matter (corporate strategy) expert,
and modifications were made based on their feedback.
After the initial interviews were done, followup email and phone
conversations were conducted to gather more info on the strategic decision making
process for the corporation as a whole (and to determine the early interviewees’
views on the state of drivers that were first identified by later interviewees). This
provided useful context to understand the details of the divest or retain decisions
for the identified strategic assets.

Chapter 4
Research Findings
Overview
The purpose of this study is to understand what factors were drivers of
decisions to divestment decisions for strategic resources at a medium size
semiconductor firm, and how the state of those drivers impacted the decision.
Interviews with senior executives and product line executives at the studied firm
were conducted. The senior executives directly participated in the divestment
decision for the firm’s assembly and test operation, and the product line executives
were responsible for strategic planning, e.g. resource allocation decisions, for their
product lines. All of the interviewees had first hand experience with the divest or
retain decision and/or the impact of the decision.
The interviewees identified four strategic assets for firms in the
semiconductor industry that were owned by the studied firm (see Figure 3). They
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determined which drove the decisions to divest or retain each of these resources,
and the state of those drivers. Those results are presented in detail in this chapter.

Divestment Decision Background – The Firm Level
Strategic View
When we endeavor to drill down and understand a detailed process that is
inextricably linked with a more complex whole, it is usually useful to step back and
take a wider view of the big picture; to understand where the detail we are studying
fits in the big picture. In order to understand the decision to divest a key
manufacturing resource studied in this case, and the embrace of the asset light
model (Page, 2007; Liou, Tang, & Huang, 2008; Liou, 2011; Surdu, 2011; Sohn,
2013) that decision represents, we can benefit from understanding the top level
corporate resource allocation strategy. Most of the interviewees, in informal
followup communication, gave similar descriptions of the top level strategic goals
of the firm, with several of them adding a unique perspective or memory.
Understanding the history of the semiconductor industry history of wholly owned
assets creates greater understanding of the asset structure of most merchant
semiconductor firms in the turn of the millennium timeframe. Follow-up
conversations and emails after the semi-structured interviews with most of the
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participants shed light on that history and of the top level firm strategy. Two of the
interviewees with the longest tenure in the industry were instrumental in fleshing
out the early history of the industry and of the asset structure common to all of the
early semiconductor manufacturers. This historical standard of ownership of all of
the identified strategic assets was the state of the studied firm before the asset light
model was implemented, and the divestment decision made.
As the interviews progressed, it was as if each participant reinforced the
descriptions of the other interviewees, yet added a few new pieces to the mosaic
that is the understanding of the detailed strategy of the firm. The relations between
the studied phenomenon, drivers of a particular strategic divestment decision, and
the other pieces of the firm’s strategy helped to clarify the importance of many of
the proposed drivers. Drivers of other strategic decisions, not related to asset
ownership were consistent with those for the divestment decision.
The firm studied faced some key strategic decisions to complete the
transition from a division of its parent, a firm that depended heavily on defense and
other stable businesses and was never comfortable with the highly volatile
semiconductor industry, to an independent firm in the hypercompetitive
semiconductor marketplace. It had just been spun off as an independent firm
funded by the personal capital of top management (most put their retirement
savings into the investment pot) and by a large venture capital firm. As the
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majority investors, the venture firm had the final say on overall corporate
strategies, but determined the strategic path through extensive collaboration with
the semiconductor firm’s managers. Their strategy was to maximize the worth of
the company to prepare for an IPO; the IPO was later successfully executed.
From the birth (or birth of significant commercial relevance) of the
semiconductor industry in the 1960’s, through the 1990’s the standard model for a
semiconductor firm was to own its production resources, which consist primarily of
wafer fabrication and assembly/test facilities, and it’s key intellectual property or
knowledge generating resources, primarily the wafer process design and circuit
design groups (see Figure 3). These were the strategic resources identified by the
interviewees.
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Figure 3. Simplified Semiconductor Design and Manufacturing Flow

Due to immaturity of semiconductor technologies in this timeframe, firms
had manufacturing processes that were unique, even idiosyncratic, and had been
developed from scratch by the firm. A firm that wanted to be in the semiconductor
market would have to “roll your own” in terms of manufacturing facilities and
process design. In the 1990’s maturing technologies enabled an alternative model
of production facilities providing technologically advanced, standardized wafer
processing and assembly and test that were owned by firms specializing in
manufacturing. As this resource began to become available, strategic options
opened that would enable small semiconductor firms with, for example, circuit
design or marketing expertise, but which lacked the extensive capital to build
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competitive manufacturing facilities to compete with the larger firms in targeted
segments.
In parallel with the shift in the manufacturing model, the booming
electronics market demanded more semiconductors in a variety of product
segments. The studied firm had the lead in the market for product in one segment,
and the market was growing at a brisk pace. They also had a toehold in another
market segment, which was also growing briskly, and a significant share in a third
segment, which was growing slowly but steadily, but with much lower margins
than the other segments.
The venture capital firm owning a majority share of the studied firm
encouraged the firm’s management team to scrutinize the manufacturing assets and
determine whether the firm could sell any of them. The VC’s viewpoint was
primarily financial, as they were not semiconductor technology experts; however,
their experience and expertise with financial markets, financial issues common to
technology firms, and IPOs brought significant value to the strategic decision
making process. The VC’s aimed to improve the firm’s return on assets (ROA).
This measure is the ratio of profitability per dollar of invested capital in assets; the
ratio can be improved by increasing the numerator in the equation, the firm’s
profitability, but also by decreasing the denominator, the value of assets. The VC’s
let the decision on market segments be led by the semiconductor management
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team. The suggested divestment of manufacturing assets would lower asset value,
while the choice of the fastest growing, highest margin segments would increase
profitability. The studied firm’s management and VCs had two major decisions to
make: which of its product lines to fund heavily, which to draw down; and the
capital structure of the firm, specifically the manufacturing capital.
The asset light manufacturing model is implemented by reducing ownership
of key manufacturing resources, and to contract for their services (Page, 2007;
Liou, Tang, & Huang, 2008; Liou, 2011; Surdu, 2011; Sohn, 2013); the decision to
implement the asset light model was driven by the VCs. This was the first and
highest level decision, at the bottom of the strategic decision influence chart (see
figure 4; the chart is somewhat simplified, as many influencing factors that have an
impact on the IPO valuation, but are not in the path of one of the strategic decisions
have not been included.)

95

Profit, $ NPV,
IPO Value
Total revenue,
$/yr

Revenue,
Segment 1

Var. Costs,
Segment 1

Total Costs,
$/yr

Revenue,
Segment 3

Revenue,
Segment 2

Corp. Fixed
costs.
Var. Costs,
Segment 2

Var. Costs,
Segment 3

R&D Segment 1
Cost of debt

Manufacturing
Capital fixed
costs

R&D Segment 2

R&D Segment 3

How to allocate R&D
spending?

Available cash

Owned or
Subcon mfg?

Increase R&D
spending or pay
down debt?

Sell wafer fabs?

Sell assembly/test?

Adopt asset light
manufac strategy?

Key

Uncertaintly

Influence of uncertainty

Decision

Influence of decision
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Once the decision to reduce manufacturing capital was made, the specific
decisions on which of the two key facilities, wafer fab or assembly/test (decisions
at the lower right side of Figure 4), would then have to be made. The firm divested
its Asian assembly and test facility, selling it to an assembly and test manufacturing
firm that was also majority owned by the same VCs with majority ownership of the
firm being studied, and was also being prepared for an IPO. The infusion of cash
that resulted from the sale could be allocated to increased R&D spending (which
would stimulate sales and reduce manufacturing variable costs), and/or to
retirement of the firm’s long term debt (which would reduce the fixed cost of debt
service), or some combination of each.
The firm chose to retire almost all of its long term debt, and still had
available to capital to increase already well funded R&D in two of the targeted
product segments. Both of these steps made the company more financially
attractive, increasing the potential IPO value. They decided to significantly
increase funding for two of the most promising segments and to sell the third lower
margin business, bringing further infusions of cash. The company was then
essentially debt free, heavily funding R&D into growing, high margin businesses,
and well positioned for its IPO.
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At the time of decision to divest the assembly and test facility, and in the
roughly eighteen years since that decision, the firm has not divested the wafer fab,
circuit design groups, or wafer fab process design groups.

Coding the Interview Results

The interviewees (four senior executives who were part of the decision
making team, and three product line general managers directly impacted by the
decision and with strategic planning responsibilities for their product lines) were
first asked what they considered to be a generic semiconductor firm’s strategic
resources, or which resources could be considered strategic for at least some
semiconductor firms. There was agreement among all interviewees that, at an
industry level, wafer fab and assembly/test manufacturing facilities, and fab process
design and circuit design groups were the major strategic resources that enable at
least some semiconductor firms to create competitive advantages. They were then
asked open ended questions about what factors were the key drivers of the
assembly and test facility divestment decision. They were then asked specifically
asked whether the ability of the resource to generate competitive advantage, the
level of capital investment required to maintain the resource, and the ability to
retain IP generated in the resource within the firm were key drivers. New drivers
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that were identified in responses to the open ended questions were added to the list
of specific drivers listed in the interview protocol (whether the resource generates
competitive advantage, capital spending required, and IP containment) in
subsequent interviews, and in follow- up phone conversations and emails with
previous interviewees. Each of the interviewees was therefore exposed to all of the
drivers identified by all of the interviewees, and given the chance to decide whether
it was indeed a driver of the decision. Each of the inteviewees was then asked the
same questions about the other strategic resources identified (wafer fab, circuit
design group, fab process design group). The list of drivers identified are listed in
Figure 5:

1) Ability of the resource to generate competitive advantage
2) Capital investment required to maintain the resource
3) Ability to contain IP generated in the resource within the firm
4) Whether or not the firm was under financial stress/emergency
5) Financial metrics and/or investor pressure on financial metrics
6) Ownership and control advantages
Figure 5. List of Possible Divestiture Drivers

The interviewees were also asked the state of the driver identified, whether
they personally considered it to be a driver of the divestment decision or not for
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each of the four strategic resources. The responses were coded per figure 6, which
lists the possible decision drivers and the possible states of those drivers.

Figure 6. Coding of Driver States

The summary of interviews is contained in Appendix D. A lower case “x”
under the “Decision Driver?” column indicates that the interviewee identified that
factor as a key decision driver of the divest or retain decision, while a blank
indicates the interviewee did not identify the factor as a key driver. The “Driver
State/Value” listed is based on the coding described in Figure 6. Interviewees were
asked for the state/value regardless of whether they considered the factor to be a
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key driver of the divestment decision or not. A blank in the “Driver State/Value”
column indicates that the interviewee did not know, or did not feel comfortable
estimating, the state/value.
Ability of the resource to create competitive advantage was coded as “yes”
if the resource enabled an important advantage with respect to competition, and as
“no” if the resource was inferior in important competitive comparisons, or if the
resource enabled competitive parity. The level of capital required was coded as
“none” if zero investment was required, “low” if required investment was less than
$5 million, “moderate” for $5 - $20 million, “high” for $20 - $100 million, and
“very high” for greater than $100 million. The timeframe for the specified
investment was the firm’s five to seven year strategic planning horizon. Ability to
contain IP was a qualitative assessment that was based on mobility of knowledge
generating employees, relative share of important IP being patented or merely trade
secrets, and the IP protection reputation of the country in which the resource is
located. Firm financial stress was also a qualitative assessment and coded as a
“yes” if the interviewee was aware of profitability or cash flow problems, and “no”
if neither of those problems were present. Importance of financial metrics was a
qualitative assessment of the importance of investor (VC’s from the investment
bank preparing the firm for its’ IPO) concerns about financial metrics, specifically
return on investment ratios. Return on capital, return on assets, return on
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investment are used interchangeably in this study, as they are all impacted similarly
by the divest or retain decisions for the identified strategic resources. Importance
of ownership/control advantages was also a quantitative assessment as to the
relative importance of this driver with respect to other key decision drivers.

Findings

The interviewees identified four basic strategic assets for the semiconductor
industry, namely wafer fabs, assembly and test facilities, circuit design groups, and
fab process design groups (see figure 3). At the time of the studied firm’s decision
to divest the assembly and test facility, the firm owned all four of these strategic
assets. Each interviewee was asked whether the potential decision drivers (figure
5) were in fact drivers of the divest or retain decision for the facility that was
divested, as well as the three resources that were not divested. Interviewees were
also asked to describe the state of the driver (without regard to whether it was a
decision driver) for each of the strategic resources, and the results coded per Figure
6.

102

Assembly and Test Facility

The studied firm’s assembly and test facility is the resource that was
divested, and inspired this study. The first proposed driver was the ability of the
resource to provide competitive advantage. Interviewees noted that a competitive
advantage for this particular resource could be either the ability to provide
specialized capabilities not generally available in the industry, or a cost advantage
for the capabilities that were not unique, that were widely available. There was
unanimous agreement among all interviewees that the ability of the resource to
provide a competitive advantage was a driver of the divestment decision, and that
the resource did not provide an advantage in terms of capabilities or cost. The state
of the driver was coded as “no” for all interviewees.
One of the decision makers, and one of the product line executives each
identified capital investment requirements as a key driver of the decision, and all
interviewees agreed that the amount of investment required (the state of the driver)
was between five and twenty million dollars over the strategic planning period of
the firm. This was coded as “moderate”. All of the interviewees agreed that the
firm was capable of providing the required capital investment if the resource was
retained, that the investment required was not an unusual burden for the firm. All
interviewees agreed that financial distress was not a driver of the divestment
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decision, and that the firm was not experiencing financial distress (driver state
coded “no”).
All of the decision makers, and one of the product line executives identified
financial metrics, or pressure from investors to improve financial metrics as being a
key decision driver. The interviewees that identified this as a decision driver
described the state as having an impact on ROI; four of the five listed it as a “large
impact on ROI”, and one as “an impact on ROI”.
All interviewees agreed that the ability to contain IP was not a driver, and
rated that ability (state of the driver) as “low” or “very low”. This is consistent
with the interviewees’ views that the facility did not provide any unique
capabilities, therefore there was little valuable IP to lose even if the facility was
unable to prevent its loss.
All interviewees identified the impact or importance of ownership and
control advantages as being an important driver of the decision, and rated the state
of the driver as “very low” (one response), “low” (three responses), or “moderate”
(three responses). The state ratings for this factor were heavily influenced by the
expected seamlessness of the transition from a firm owned resource to a contracted
one. The interviewees explained that the facility would be operated as a
semiautonomous division of the purchasing firm, that the same management team
would remain in place, and that attractive pricing similar to the firm’s internal costs

104

would be offered. The loss of the ability to have complete control over
prioritization of batches processed was partially mitigated by the granting of a
limited number of batch expedite privileges. Each of the interviewees believed that
these agreements were honored after the sale was completed, and the transition was
smooth and seamless.
When asked whether they thought the decision to divest the facility was the
correct one, six of the seven interviewees agreed that the decision was the correct
one. The one product line executive that disagreed thought that the value of
ownership/control was a big enough advantage to justify retaining the facility. This
executive did not believe that financial metrics/investor pressure was a driver of the
divestment decision, and did not provide a rating of the state of that driver.

Wafer Fab Facility

The firm operated one wafer fab facility that build product for the firm’s
core product lines, and has continued to retain ownership of and operate the
facility. The interviewees stated that a wafer fab, like an assembly and test facility,
can provide competitive advantage either by providing unique capabilities or by
providing common capabilities at low cost. They unanimously identified the
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ability to generate competitive advantage a driver of the decision not to divest the
wafer fab, and noted unique capabilities as the specific advantage that the fab does
provide (and one interviewee even identified cost as a disadvantage, although
outweighed by capability advantages). The state was code as “yes” for all
responses.
All interviewees identified capital investment requirements as a divestment
decision driver, and rated the state of the driver as “high” or “very high”.
Corporate financial distress was not identified as a decision driver, all agreed that
there was no distress, and the state was coded as “no” for all responses. Three of
four decision makers and one of three product line executives identified financial
metrics/investor pressure as a driver, and rated the state of the driver as “very large
impact on ROI” (three responses) or “large impact on ROI” (one response).
The ability to contain IP was identified by all four decision makers, and two
of three product line executives as a decision driver; the state of the driver was
rated as high by all of those who believed it did drive the decision not to divest.
The IP of importance was tied to the unique capabilities that the wafer fab was able
to provide (which enabled a competitive advantage), and the interview subjects
noted that much of this IP was protected by patents and the fab operated in the US,
a country in which IP ownership was protected in practice. The interviewees
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thought that the ability to protect IP would be low if the fab was located in a
country with poor IP protection laws or enforcement.
All interviewees agree that importance of ownership and control advantages
was a driver of the divest or retain decision for the wafer fab, and rated the state of
the driver as “high” (five responses) or “very high” (two responses).
When asked whether they thought the decision to retain, not divest, the
wafer fab was the correct one, all interviewees agree that the decision was the
correct one. They saw the unique capabilities of the fab as a competitive
advantage.

Circuit Design Group

All of those interviewed identified the ability to provide a competitive
advantage as driver of the decision not to divest the circuit design groups. All
agreed that the design groups do indeed provide a competitive advantage, and the
state of the driver was coded as “yes” for all responses. Many of the interviewees
stated that the design groups represented the firm’s most important competitive
advantage. The ability of the firm to contain IP generated or residing in the design
groups was also identified as a divestment decision driver, and rated the state of the
driver as “high” (four responses), or “very high” (three responses). The
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interviewees stated that almost all of the competitive advantage generated by the
design groups is in the form of IP. The location of the design groups in the US was
noted as one of the reasons the ability to contain IP was high or very high.
Design groups were noted as predominantly a human, rather than physical,
resource and capital investment required was rated as “low” (six responses) or
“none” (one response). Capital investment requirements were not identified as a
decision driver. Financial distress was not identified as a driver, nor was financial
metrics/investor pressure.
All four of the decision makers, and two of three of the product line
executives identified the importance of ownership and control of the design groups
to be divestment decision driver. The state of the driver was rates as “high” (four
responses) or “very high” (two responses).
When asked whether they thought the decision to retain, not divest, the
circuit design group was the correct one, all interviewees agree that the decision
was the correct one. They saw the IP that this group generated to be one of the key
assets of the firm; this IP enabled superior product performance that constitutes a
competitive advantage.
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Fab Process Design Group

The ability to generate unique capabilities in the wafer fab facility is
dependent upon the fab process design group. All interviewees agreed that this
group was able to create IP that enabled the competitive advantages that the unique
wafer fab facility capabilities represent, and that this ability was a key factor in the
decision not to divest this group.
As in the case of circuit design groups, the fab process design group is a
human, not capital, resource. All of the interviewees agreed that capital investment
requirements were not a driver of the decision not to divest the fab design group,
with state ratings for capital investment ranging from “none” to “low”. None of the
interviewees rated financial duress or financial metrics as a driver of the decision to
not divest this group.
All of those interviewed identified the ability to contain IP as a driver of the
decision to not divest the fab process design group, with four rating the state of the
driver as “high”, and three as “very high”. The ability of the firm to maintain the
unique wafer fab capabilities that this group enabled were dependent upon keeping
the IP generated by the group within the firm. Divesting the group and depending
upon contractual arrangements for its services would have negated the unique fab
capability competitive advantage.
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Six of seven of the interviewees indicated that impact/importance of
ownership/control was a driver of the decision not to divest this resource (the one
product line executive did not rate it as a driver, nor estimate its state). Four
respondents rated the state of the driver as “high”, two as “very high”. Followup
discussions with these six interviewees revealed that the importance of ownership
control centered upon being able to contain the IP the group generated.
When asked whether they thought the decision to retain, not divest, the
wafer fab design group was the correct one, all interviewees agree that the decision
was the correct one. They saw the IP that this group generated to be one of the key
assets of the firm; this IP enabled the unique capabilities in the wafer fab that
constitute competitive advantages.

Summary

The interviewees identified four basic strategic assets for the semiconductor
industry. They unanimously agreed that the ability of a resource to create
competitive advantage was a driver of the decision to divest each of the four
resources or not. There was strong consensus that impact of ownership/control was
also a driver of divest or retain decisions for all identified strategic resources.
There was strong consensus that for resources requiring moderate to high levels of
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capital investment (see coding section below for specific meanings of described
levels), that financial metrics/investor pressure, and the level of capital expenditure
required were drivers of divest or retain decisions. For resources that were human,
rather than capital, and generated IP that enabled competitive advantage, there was
consensus that the ability to contain IP within the firm was a driver of the divest or
retain decision. Figure 7 presents a summary of the important decision drivers for
each resource’s divest or retain decision; an “x” in the cell indicates consensus
among inteviewees (at least six of seven agreed) that the factor identified in the
column is a driver of divest/retain decisions for the resources in that row. Firm
financial distress is not included, as none of the interview subjects identified it as a
decision driver for any of the four resources.

Figure 7. Drivers of Divest or Retain Decision by Strategic Resource
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Figure 8 presents a summary of the influence of driver states on the
divest/retain decision. This data was gathered in followup conversations with
interviewees; they were asked to rate the potential drivers independently, i.e.
without any knowledge of the state of the other potential drivers or of the particular
resource being addressed. Only potential drivers that were identified as actual
drivers for at least on resource are included.

Figure 8. Influence of Driver States on Divest or Retain Decision

Chapter 5
Discussion, Conclusions, Application,
and Further Research
Discussion and Implications

As noted in the background discussion in Chapter 4, the history of the birth
and growth of the semiconductor industry resulted in all, or at least most, firms in
the sector owning all four of the identified strategic resources until the 1990s. As
the industry matured, and alternatives for the supply of the services provided by the
resources became available, new strategic resource allocation choices became
available to managers of those firms. However, as several of the interview subjects
pointed out, in the absence of outside pressure to realign capital resources in light
of financial performance metrics, inertia ruled. Senior executives responsible for
making strategic resource allocation decisions came predominantly from
112

113

engineering, rather than financial, backgrounds; those engineers loved to have big
production facilities to manage, and were not necessarily attuned to the needs of
stock markets. The attitudes of the leadership of most semiconductor firms in the
1990s was typified by the statement of Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) CEO
Jerry Sanders who famously (or infamously) stated that “… real men have fabs”
(Hoff, 1994). Whether Sanders was referring to the perceived ability of the wafer
manufacturing facility to create competitive advantage, or to ownership/control
advantages remains unclear, but his commitment to own this particular capital
resource was unambiguous. His implication that a firm is not a “real”
semiconductor player without a captive fab and by extension a captive assembly
and test facility represented the zeitgeist of the industry in the very late 20 th
century.
The increasingly hypercompetitive nature of the semiconductor industry
(Thomas & D’Aveni, 2009) and increasing investor pressure for continuously
improving profitability and return on investment forced firms in the industry to reevaluate their capital strategies. Even AMD CEO Jerry Sanders led AMD away
from the wholly owned production facility model and transitioned to contracted
wafer manufacturing (Sterling, 2008). Cypress, a semiconductor firm founded in
1982, divested its wafer fab in 2017, moving to the contracted wafer manufacturing
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model (Cypress, 2017), indicating that this is not strictly a turn of the millennium
phenomenon.
In the two instances noted above, as well as in the specific case addressed in
this study, financial metrics and the lack of the ability of the resource to provide a
competitive advantage were noted as drivers of the divestment decision. This
supports the assumption that the studied case is representative, or at least not
completely atypical, and that the results may be generalizable to the semiconductor
industry or beyond. It may be argued that the studied case was atypical because
financial pressure came from institutional investors preparing the firm for an IPO.
However, prior to the leveraged buyout of the firm from its parent company, its
detailed financial results including ROI and other measures of capital efficiency
were aggregated with the rest of the parent firm, and were not scrutinized by
investors as closely as other semiconductor firms’ performance. The author
contends that the process of becoming an independent semiconductor firm was
actually a normalization process, as the firm was now being evaluated as a
standalone semiconductor manufacturer and held to the same financial performance
standards as most of its competitors, bolstering the argument that the case examines
an instrumental, or representative firm (Cresswell, 2013; Stake, 1995).
The executives interviewed identified different decision drivers for the four
strategic resources investigated, and the states of all of the possible decision drivers
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were rated. Competitive advantage was unanimously agreed as being a driver of
divest or retain decisions for all four resources regardless of the state of the driver
(yes or no). For the other possible drivers, the states of the drivers corresponded to
whether it was indeed a divest/retain decision driver or not. Capital investment
requirements were not identified as a decision driver unless the value of the driver
was above a threshold. If the level of capital investment required was “none” or
“low”, no interviewees identified it as a decision driver. When capital investment
was rated “moderate”, two of seven interviewees identified it as a decision driver,
five did not. If the state was “high” or “very high”, all interviewees agreed that it
was a decision driver. Ability to contain IP was unanimously agreed to be a
decision driver if that ability was rated as “high” or “very high”, and there was also
unanimous agreement that that it was not a decision driver if the state was “low” or
“very low” (there were no “moderate” ratings for any resource). All interviewees
agreed that financial distress was not a decision driver for any of the strategic
resources, and all rated the state as “no”. Financial metrics/investor pressure was
agreed to be a decision driver if the impact of the possible divestment was
“moderate”, “high”, or “very high”, and to not be a decision driver if the impact
was “low” or “none”. All interviewees agree that the impact of ownership/control
advantages was a decision driver regardless of the state of the driver. These results
are summarized in figure 9. A “yes” in the table indicates that the potential
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decision driver was an actual decision driver for the specified state of the driver, a
“no” indicates it was not. “No consensus” indicates lack of agreement among the
interviewees, and a blank cell means that none of the interviewees rated the
potential driver with the corresponding state.

Figure 9. Decision Drivers vs. Driver State

Interviewees were asked whether they thought the divestment of the Asian
assembly and test facility was the right decision. With almost two decades of
hindsight, six of seven interviewees felt the facility divestment was the correct
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decision. Those who felt the divestment decision was correct noted the advantages
of being able to use the proceeds of the sale to pay down corporate debt. fund
increased R&D in strategically important product lines, and improve return on
investment ratios. The lone dissenter on the wisdom of the divestment believed
that the loss of ownership and control advantages outweighed the advantages of the
sale.
The interviewees also observed that without the constraints of the particular
capabilities available in the owned facility, the firm could utilize a much wider
variety of packaging technologies available from merchant assembly and test firms.
The firm had actually begun this process before the facility sale, but that process
accelerated after the sale. This served to widen the product and market segments
that were available for expansion, to enlarge the universe of strategic options. They
believed that the divestment made the firm more nimble and capable of quickly
pivoting as new opportunities appeared, of implementing emergent strategies
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). In the age of temporary advantage (D’Aveni,
Dagnino, & Smith, 2010), investment in expensive, inflexible capital assets limits a
firm’s ability to exploit changing market opportunities, and the sale of the assembly
and test facility removed some of those limitations.

It is also possible that

interacting with an expanded supplier and technology base improved the firm’s
exposure to new knowledge and improved absorptive capacity (March and Simon,
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1958) encouraging innovation and successive temporary advantages, although none
of the interviewees mentioned this as a benefit of the divestment.
The interviewees were also asked whether the retain decisions (still
standing as of this writing in early 2018) for the wafer fab and circuit and fab
process design groups were the correct ones. There was unanimous agreement that
the retain decisions were correct. For the circuit and fab process design groups, the
executives noted that capital investment was nominal, and therefore financial
metrics would not be positively impacted by divesting the resource. They felt that
these groups did enable competitive advantages, almost exclusively in the form of
IP that the company was able to protect and keep within the firm through both legal
patent protections and trade secret management protocols.
The wafer fab manufacturing facility was significantly more capital
intensive than the assembly and test facility, yet the executives interviewed
believed that the unique capabilities the fab provided were rare, valuable,
inimitable, and organizationally exploitable (Barney, 1991). Those capabilities
represented a true competitive advantage that the firm could not match by other
investments made with the proceeds of a sale of the facility. The executives also
realized that the fab process design group was inextricably linked with the wafer
fab itself, and they would have to be divested or retained as a group.
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The firm had enhanced its dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007; Eisenhardt &
Martin, 2000) with the transition from wholly owned to subcontracted assembly
and test services, yet remained invested in a captive wafer fab. The firm did
modify its wafer fab manufacturing strategy to a fab-light strategy, utilizing
contracted resources for the most cost sensitive and/or fast evolving technology
needs, while refocusing the owned wafer fab on the unique process capabilities
with high value. These technology niches were valued in markets small enough to
not attract competition from the biggest competitors who could duplicate the
capabilities given the will to invest the significant time and money necessary to
equal or better the studied firm’s capabilities. The firm had a defensible advantage
in technology with extensive patent and trade secret protections that was highly
valued by very specific market segments. It made sense to retain these IP based
advantages in a facility in the US where legal protection of patented IP and
practical protection of trade secrets were more manageable than in countries with
less effective IP protection environments. Contracted wafer fab services were
utilized for manufacture of products that did not value the unique capabilities that
the captive wafer fab represented.
The information gathered during the initial interviews and through followup
conversation provided insight into the factors driving the decision to divest the
assembly and test facility in Asia. Insight can also be gained through noting which
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factors are mentioned in the literature, but were not brought up in the initial
interviews, nor deemed important when brought up in followup conversations.
Buckley and Casson (1998) listed several factors that would inhibit the
internationalization process, (or, by extension of their logic, encourage pullback or
divestment) such as cultural differences including psychic distance and lack of
trust. All of the executives interviewed noted that they had good, close, trusting,
productive working relationships with the management of the facility both before
and after the sale. Clearly these factors were not among those driving the
divestment decision, although they may be for other resources in other firms and
other hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based industries.
Similarly, the impact of transaction costs were not mentioned; Williamson
(1971) noted that reduction of transaction costs was an incentive for vertical
integration and, by extension of his logic a disincentive for divestment or
disintegration. None of the interviewees thought that transaction costs were
considered (or should have been considered) as an important factor in reaching the
divest or retain decision. A significant portion of the transaction cost impact can be
explained by the differential in cost of resolving conflicts in vertically integrated
vs. indepentant firms (Whinston, 1964). In vertically integrated firms resolution is
simply a matter of internal executive fiat, which is quick and efficient; for interfirm
contractual arrangements, potentially protracted negotiations or legal action may be
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necessary, which are slow, contentious, and costly processes. The positive
relationships with the management of the facility, and the lack of conflicts and
disagreements due in large part to these relationships, prevented dispute resolution
efficiency to be a significant or driving factor in the divestment decision. In other
firms or industries where these relationships do not exist, or did not create the same
level of trust, dispute resolution efficiency may indeed be a driving factor
discouraging divestment or encouraging retaining ownership control.
None of the interviewees was familiar with any of the academic literature
referenced in this study, and were therefore not influenced (at least directly) by that
literature. Each was driven by his or her direct personal experience and reasoning,
and by the experiences and knowledge shared by their colleagues and mentors.
They each had a very pragmatic view of their role in the management of the firm,
including the divest/retain decisions referenced in this study. It is notable that the
Asian facility divestment decision was considered in the 1999-2000 timeframe,
before much of the relevant literature was on the asset light capital model was
published. This suggests that in at least some cases, practitioners are leading the
way in the development of several key pieces of strategic theory, while the
academics follow, tying new these new developments into a larger, coherent and
cohesive strategic framework.

122

Conclusions and Contribution to Applied Practice

The study research questions addressed by this study are:

1) What are the drivers of specific strategic resource divestment decisions in
the semiconductor industry?
2) Can the state of the drivers be used to predict the probability or advisability
of strategic resource divestiture in the semiconductor industry?

The interview subjects identified the drivers of the divest or retain decisions
to be the ability to create competitive advantage, capital investment required to
maintain the resource, ability to contain IP created by the resource within the firm,
impact of the asset on financial ratios (and investor pressure to improve those
ratios), and the importance of ownership and control advantages. The influence of
those drivers on the divest/retain decision is summarized in figure 9.
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Figure 10. Strategic Resource Divestment Decision Model

The state of the drivers determines whether that driver is an important
consideration in the divest/retain decision, and provides guidance as to the correct
decision. A summary of the discussion of the effect of driver states follows, and is
summarized in figure 8 in chapter 4.
A resource that has the ability to create a competitive advantage for the firm
will encourage a retain decision for that resource, while the lack of that ability will
encourage a divest decision. This is consistent with the asset contention in the
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literature that firms will outsource activities in the value chain that are not core
strengths of the firm to other firms that can perform those activities more
efficiently, or in some other superior manner (Surdu, 2011). It can be argued that a
resource that does not create significant competitive advantage is not a strategic
resource.
The level of capital investment required to maintain a resource, and the
impact of those requirements on financial metrics were each found to be drivers of
the divest/retain decision. These factors can be important both because of the
firm’s ability to fund the required investment, the possible use of the same funds in
other, higher return assets or activities, and because of investor expectations for
return on investment. A higher level of required investment, and higher levels of
importance of financial ratios each encourage divestment of the resource being
evaluated.
The ability to retain IP created by a resource within the firm is a
divest/retain decision driver if the IP is valuable to the firm. For resources where
IP generation represents a large portion of the resource’s value to the firm,
increasing ability to protect that IP increasingly encourages retention of the
resource. The importance of management control of owned resources was also
identified as a decision driver, with increasing importance of control increasingly
encouraging retention of the resource.
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Although the literature specifically states that firm financial distress is a
driver of divestment decisions (Boddewyn, 1979), none of the executives
interviewed listed it as a decision driver, while noting that the firm was not
experiencing any financial hardship. While it was not a driver of divest/retain
decisions for the studied firm, it may be for other firms that are experiencing
financial distress, and cannot be discounted as a possible driver in a more general
model.
Determining the optimal capital asset structure of a semiconductor firm is
one of the major tasks of executives responsible for firm strategic planning. The
case studied was a firm that made divest or retain decisions for strategic assets in
the same hypercompetitive environment as other semiconductor firms, with similar
capital requirements for the identified strategic assets, and with similar investor
expectations. Other semiconductor firms also made decisions to divest strategic
resources (Cypress, 2017; Sterling, 2008) supporting the contention that the case is
illustrative and representative (Stake, 1995), at least for other semiconductor firms.
The case may also be more generally representative of firms operating in other
hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based industries, but further
research will be required to support that contention.
Practitioners in semiconductor firms that are making capital resource
allocation decisions may find the divestment decision model in this study to be a
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useful tool for deciding whether to divest or retain strategic (or formerly strategic)
resources. It provides a framework for decision making, although it is not a
rigorous, deterministic formula for the decision. By rating the state of the decision
drivers, executives can move towards a holistic view of the decision and its impact
on the performance of the firm. In a real world scenario, however, the factors must
also be weighted for their importance, which may vary in individual circumstances.
For instance, a firm that is privately owned may not assign the same level of
importance to financial ratios than one that is publicly traded. A firm such as
Apple, with $285 billion in cash reserves (Hunter & Balakrishnan, 2018), does not
have much pressure to carefully allocate capital investments to only the highest
return opportunities, and therefore the level of investment required for a strategic
resource does not weigh heavily on its capital structure decisions. Regardless of
the individual circumstances affecting the relative weighting of the identified
divest/retain drivers, semiconductor firms (and perhaps other firms in
hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based industries), can benefit from
understanding the state of the drivers and the influence of those drivers on the
divest/retain decision.
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Further Research

The case study that forms the basis of this dissertation is that of a medium
sized semiconductor firm that is typical of medium sized firms in that industry, in
that it utilized similar technologies, and had similar capital asset structures as other
semiconductor firms before the asset light model became prevalent in the industry.
These similarities to other firms in the industry support the assumption that the firm
is representative of that industry. However, there are unique circumstances in
every case that can be studied, and claims that a case is representative must be
made cautiously. The studied firm was not under financial distress, and while this
lack of distress is a common situation in the industry, it is not a universal condition.
The decision to divest the assembly and test facility was heavily influenced by the
investment bank that was the firm’s majority owner, and was preparing the firm for
an IPO. Therefore, further study of other semiconductor firms’ decision both to
divest and to retain specific strategic resources represents an area of research that
could either strengthen or qualify the conclusions reached in this study.
An at least partial list of divestment decision drivers has been identified,
and a coding scheme for the state of the drivers that can be mapped to a five point
Likert like scale or a binary choice has been devised. Gathering data from more
divest or retain decisions will enable quantitative analysis of the relative
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importance of each of the drivers and their states, and the usefulness of that data for
making a divest or retain decision.
Given the possible limitations of the application of the results of this case
study to other semiconductor firms, it may seem to be a bridge too far to extend the
results even farther to other hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge based
industries, or industries that share only one of two of those descriptions. However,
many firm level strategic concepts can apply across even very diverse industries.
Nikolaou (2006) notes the common challenges of monitoring and control of
manufacturing processes that drive success in industries as dissimilar as snack
foods and semiconductors (potato chips and microchips); the existence of common
theoretical frameworks in such disparate industries suggests the existence of
strategic commonalities in much more similar industries. While it cannot be
assumed that the results of this study are universally applicable to other similar
industries, further research in other hypercompetitive, capital intensive, knowledge
based industries may generalize the findings of this study. D’Aveni (1998, p. 183)
specifically lists “airline, pharmaceutical, financial services, health care, consumer
electronics, telecommunications, broadcasting, auditing, automotive, and computer
industries, among many others…” as examples of other hypercompetitive
industries, and many of them may be capital intensive and knowledge based.
Further study of divestments in these industries appears warranted.
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Appendix A – Definition of Terms and
Abbreviations
Assembly. The process of encapsulating a silicon chip in a package.
Asset light. A resource management strategy whereas capital assets are
minimized in order to produce the best return on assets, and to allow a firm
to be more nimble in its choice of capital assets employed.
Back end. Refers to semiconductor packaging and test manufacturing
facilities, the last part, or “back end” of the integrated circuit manufacturing
process.
CA. Competitive advantage. A strategically important advantage that a
firm holds with respect to its’ competitors. See “VRIN” and “VRIO”.
Capital light. See asset light.
Chip. A single unpackaged copy of an integrate circuit; a piece of a
processed silicon wafer. An intermediate product in the production of
finished integrated circuits.
Fab. See wafer fab.
FDI. Foreign direct investment. Investments by a firm that result in partial
or complete ownership of foreign resources.
Front end. Refers to semiconductor wafer fabrication facilities, the first part
or “front end” of the integrated circuit manufacturing process.
Foundry, or wafer foundry. A semiconductor wafer manufacturing firm
that does not design or market semiconductor products, but provides wafer
fabrication services to semiconductor design and marketing firms.
Greenfield investment. A form of foreign direct investment whereby a firm
builds new facilities in a foreign country, as opposed to purchasing existing
facilities.
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High velocity industry. An industry experiencing fast, frequent changes in
technologies utilized, products offered, and competitive positions.
Hypercompetitive industry. A high velocity industry characterized by
intense competition, eroding pricing, and disruptive products and
technologies.
IC. Integrated circuit. A functional electronic circuit fabricated from
silicon or other semiconductor material encased in a protective package.
IB. International business. The study of the MNE, firms with sales and/or
operations in multiple countries.
IJV. International joint venture.
IDM. Integrated device manufacturer. A firm that owns all, or a significant
portion of, the capital assets (especially manufacturing facilities) used in the
design and manufacture of its products.
IP. Intellectual property.
IPO. Initial public offering.
KBV. Knowledge based view. The view that all (or most) competitive
advantage is based on knowledge, not physical assets.
Knowledge based industry. An industry in which competitive advantage is
based primarily on a firm’s knowledge based assets such as intellectual
property and trade secrets, not physical assets.
Low velocity industry. An industry experiencing slow, infrequent changes
in technologies utilized, products offered, and competitive positions.
MNE. Multinational enterprise. A corporation with operations in multiple
countries.
Package. An encapsulation of a silicon chip that protects the chip and
provides electrical connections from the silicon to the system in which it is
used.
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Packaging. See assembly.
PMO. Pure manufacturing outsourcing. A production model where a firm
contracts for all of its manufacturing requirements, and does not own
manufacturing assets.
RBV. Resource based view.
Red queen race. A description of a competitive situation such that a firm
must continually innovate and develop new products just to maintain an
existing competitive position. The concept was introduced by Lewis
Carroll in Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There.
According to the Red Queen, “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running
you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else,
you must run at least twice as fast as that!” (Carroll, 1893, p. 52).
Rent. Abnormally high financial returns enabled by competitive
advantages.
ROI. Return on investment; a blanket term for various profitability to
capital or other investments ratios.
ROIC. Return on invested capital. Net income for a specified period of
time divided by the average total capital for the same period.
Strategic asset/strategic resource. An asset consisting of physical resources
or organizational capabilities that are necessary to perform a firm’s stated
mission, and that enable a firm to generate economic rents (Amit &
Shoemaker, 1993). In the context of this study, a strategic resource is
defined at the industry level; it enables competitive advantage and rent
generation in at least some firms within an industry, but not necessarily in
all firms in that industry.
TCE. Transaction cost economics. The theory that contractual governance
for the supply of goods and services creates transaction costs that are not
present if the goods and services are supplied from within the firm.
Test. Electrical testing of an integrated circuit to ensure its functionality
and parametric performance.

148

VC. Venture capitalist; the managers of the venture capital firm with
ownership of the majority of the studied firm.
VRIN. Valuable, rare, inimitable, nonsubstitutable; Barney’s (1991) list of
conditions that must be met for a resource to represent a competitive
advantage.
VRIO. Valuable, rare, inimitable, and organizationally exploitable.
Barney’s (2002a) update to VRIN which includes the concept that a
resource must be able to be effectively exploited by the organization in
order to be a source of competitive advantage.
Wafer. A thin disk of single crystal silicon, or other semiconductor
material, that is transformed into functional circuits in semiconductor wafer
fab facilities. Wafer can refer to the raw starting silicon material, or to a
processed product containing copies of a circuit. A processed wafer is an
intermediate product in the manufacture of integrated circuits.
Wafer fab. Short for wafer fabrication facility. The wafer fab is a
manufacturing facility that creates a finished semiconductor wafer
containing hundreds to thousands of copies of an integrated circuit.
Building modern wafer fabs require billions of dollars of investment.
WACC. Weighted average cost of capital.
WOS. Wholly owned subsidiary. A division, group, or separately named
entity that is 100% owned and managed by a parent firm, and may be
located in a country other than the parent firm’s home country.
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Appendix B – Interview Protocol

1. What assets would you define as a semiconductor firms’ strategic
resources?
2. Why did the company divest its assembly and test facility in Asia? What
were the key drivers of the decision? What are the states or conditions of
those drivers?
3. What would drive divestiture decisions for other strategic resources such as
wafer fabs or design groups? Other strategic resources? What are the states
or conditions of those drivers?
4. To what degree was the Asian assembly and test facility able to generate
competitive advantage or parity? How much did the ability (or lack
thereof) to generate competitive advantage a driver of the divestment
decision?
5. How large were the capital investments required to maintain the facility’s
competitive advantages or parity? Was the company able to adequately
fund the required capital investments?
6. How important was the level of capital investment required to the facility
divestment decision? How important is the level of capital investment to
the divestment for other strategic resources?
7. For intellectual property generated within the facility, to what degree could
the IP be contained within the facility (not leaked to competitors)?
8. How much did the ability to contain IP within the company drive the
divestiture decision for the facility? To what degree would this ability drive
divestiture decisions for other strategic resources?
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9. Were there any other factors (besides ability to generate competitive
advantage, capital funding requirements, ability to contain IP) that
contributed to the divestment decision for the KL facility? For other
strategic resources?
10. Do you believe the divestment was a success? Why or why not?
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Appendix C. Participant Consent Letter

Consent to Participate in Divestment Theory Research
I am performing research for my dissertation that attempts to explain the factors
driving the decision to divest important corporate resources when firms implement
an asset light strategy. The academic literature describes the reasoning behind
implementing this strategy, but does not detail the specific drivers of decisions to
divest a specific resource, and not others. I am performing a case study of (firm
name redacted) decision to sell their assembly and test production facility in 2000
in order to develop theory that may be applicable to other divestment decisions.
I am asking people who were involved in the decision to sell (firm name redacted)
assembly and test facility, and those who were impacted by the decision to
participate in an interview and share their understanding of the decision making
process and impact of the decisions. The interviews may be either in person or
over the phone. I will audio record and transcribe the interviews. (firm name
redacted) and the people who agree to be interviewed will not be identified in any
published material. I will be the only person who has access to any personally
identifying information, and your anonymity will be protected. (firm name
redacted) will be referred to as “a medium size semiconductor firm”, and the
interviewees will be identified by a general description of their position at the time
of the divestiture (for example, senior executive participating in the divestment
decision, or manager affected by implementation of the decision). Audio
recordings and transcripts will be stored on password protected computers and will
only be accessible by me, the dissertation author. Transcripts that include no
personally identifying information, only the general descriptions of the position of
the interviewee, may be accessed by a research assistant. The research assistant
will not know the interviewees personally, and will not be able to discern the
specific individual interviewed.
Very little risk is anticipated for interviewees. The only risk that can be anticipated
is that current employees may inadvertently mention proprietary or company
confidential information. Transcripts of the interviews will be made available to
the interviewees so that they can review them to make sure nothing inappropriate
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has been said, and interviewees may redact, or eliminate, any portion of the
interview that they are not comfortable with.
All interviewees will be offered a complete copy of the dissertation upon its
completion; the results may be of use to executives considering further divestment
decisions, or may be of interest to other interviewees with curiosity about the
justification for specific decision to sell the assembly and test facility.
Participation is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue participation at
any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
Contact info for the dissertation author and for Florida Institute of Technology’s
institutional review board is:
Steven R. Rivet, Dissertation Author
srivet@fit.edu
321 431 9878

Dr. Lisa Steelman, IRB Chairperson
lsteelma@fit.edu or FIT_IRB@fit.edu
321-674-7316

I hereby grant my informed consent to participate in the research program
described above.
Name (Print) _______________________

Date: _______________________

Signature: ___________________________________
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